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Current trends in plant maintenance in both govern-
ment and industry indicate a strong impetus toward contrac-
tual maintenance (CM) . As plant processes continue to be-
come more sophisticated and pollution control requirements
add additional new processing responsibilities to the exist-
ing ones, owners are turning to CM to reduce capital expend-
itures, reduce operational downtims, and obtain required
skills to perform specialized maintenance services. Deci-
sions to procure complete contractual maintenance services
have been deterred, however, by the inability of plant own-
ers to develop a priori estimates of major maintenance re-
quirements for the contract period and to describe the re-
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quirements in a complete set of plans and specifications.
Accordingly, in order to maintain control over the contract
forces and ensure that plant maintenance policies are car-
ried out, most plant owners procure CM through labor broker-
age contracts, on a unit cost basis, or enter into cost-plus
arrangements that allow limited supervision of CM forces by
the owner.
Plant owners are now faced with the dilemma of re-
quiring complete CM services from outside sources on the one
hand, and ensuring that plant maintenance policies are ful-
filled without an a priori description of each potential
maintenance act to be performed on the other hand. In order
to solve the dilemma, since there can be no a priori assess-
ment of the ultimate scope of work that may be needed during
the contract period, a contract basis is required that ex-
erts a legally enforceable obligation on the contractor to
generate the plant maintenance requirements through continu-
ous inspections during the contract period, to plan and es-
timate the resources required to fulfill each requirement as
it arises, and to subsequently schedule the performance of
the work in accordance with priorities established by plant
maintenance policy. Since the contract bids or proposals
will tend to be in proportion to the subjectively assessed
risk involved, the contract should be low risk but at the
same time it should provide incentive to maintain the plant

in accordance with plant maintenance policy.
An existing maintenance contract that approaches
the proposed format is analyzed as it applies to generation
of work, planning, and scheduling. The key feature missing
from the contract analyzed is the decision model required
to control job priority and scheduling decisions and ensure
compliance with plant maintenance policy.
A decision model is developed for the contract being
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Each year as pollution control statutes become in-
creasingly more stringent in the application of effluent
standards, government and industry find it necessary to
build new sophisticated treatment plants or to add addition-
al new equipment to existing treatment plants to process
their refuse and waste effluent. This marked increase in
process requirements has come at a time when the nation is
in a continuing period of rapid technological change. In
many cases, the agencies or industries involved have been
unable to obtain "in-house" the quantity and quality of man-
power and equipment needed to facilitate the technological
changes or meet the new processing requirements. According-
ly, one solution to this problem has been to procure the
needed services from contract sources. A major service area
that has achieved a great increase in contract procurement
(1)*has been plant maintenance.
Although contractual maintenance (CM) is widespread,
this area of contracting is the subject of great controver-
sy. In order for contractual maintenance to be a viable
Parenthetical references placed superior to the
line of text refer to the bibliography.

alternative to force account maintenance its implementation
should cost no more than the initial manpower and capital
equipment acquisitions, manpower development, and subsequent
operational expenditures necessary to perform the service by
force account. Moreover, the owner's interests should be
protected at least as well as they are perceived to be pro-
tected through force account maintenance. However, there is
evidence that many plant owners do not believe that CM will
cost less and protect their interests as well as force ac-
count maintenance and there is, therefore, a great deal of
resistance to complete CM by those owners.
A clearer view of the CM controversy can be gained
when one analyzes the nature of plant maintenance and the
existing contract arrangements commonly used to fulfill the
plant maintenance requirements.
By nature, plant maintenance covers two areas of
maintenance action commonly called preventive maintenance
(PM) and corrective maintenance. PM requirements can be an-
ticipated a priori** and corrective maintenance requirements
cannot. In this regard, since corrective maintenance re-
quirements cannot be anticipated a priori with certainty,
the maintenance decision maker is faced with uncertainty




when estimating the expected cost of maintaining the plant
for the next maintenance period. Accordingly, contractors
preparing a proposal for a CM service must perceive this
uncertainty as a "risk" and when faced with a contractual
pricing arrangement that places the plant maintenance risk
on them, the contractors must assign an expected value to
that risk and include it in their proposal. Depending on
the degree of risk assigned to the contractor, then, the
owner will pay an immediate premium for the contractor's
risk that would not necessarily arise as an explicit immed-
iate cost in force account maintenance.
Because of the risk premium implied in any "fixed-
price" contract many owners who desire CM services have pro-
cured these services through "cost-plus" agreements whereby
the owner pays the contractor all of his costs plus some
agreed upon profit. Obviously, this type of pricing arrange-
ment provides little incentive for the contractor to reduce
costs o.r protect the owner's interests since his profit is,
in most cases, not affected by those factors.
In order for complete CM to be a viable alternative
to force account maintenance, a contract framework with a
low-cost pricing arrangement (relative to the force account
alternative) and controls that protect the owner's interests
must be provided. Since the contract cost will be in direct
proportion to the contract risk assessed by the contractor,

a more descriptive statement of the contract framework re-
quirements would be (a) low contractor risk and (b) protec-
tion of owner interests.
Considering the low contractor risk requirement on
the contract framework and the uncertainties inherent in
plant maintenance, it is apparent that the fixed-price pric-
ing arrangement would not meet the low risk test. Similarly,
the need to control costs and protect the owner's interests
obviates the cost-plus pricing arrangement. Obviously, then,
since these two pricing arrangements comprise the opposite
poles of pricing arrangements, a contractual framework must
be developed that includes a pricing arrangement that falls
optimally between these two poles. In this regard, a frame-
work is implied that should tend to minimize contractor risk
and maximize protection of owner interests.
Since the contract framework proposed to be developed
must be low cost and protect the owner's interests relative
to any alternative force account framework, it is logical to
assume that the contract framework might be constructed sim-
ilar to a successful force account framework for plant maint-
enance. A contract is nothing more than an agreement (oral
or in writing) between two parties wherein one party agrees
to provide goods or services to another party in return for
other consideration. Allegorically, a contract between a
plant owner and a contractor is similar to an employment

agreement between an employer and an employee. In the con-
text of plant maintenance, the owner's employees have agreed
to provide the services needed in return for their pay. It
is axiomatic in force account plant maintenance that the
quasi-systems analysis approach to maintenance, termed
"maintenance management," is used to protect the owner's
interests.
Within the maintenance management system, the deci-
sions to be made under uncertainty in regard to corrective
maintenance are controlled by owner guidelines and informal
decision models expressed as plant maintenance policy. The
employees have incentive to make decisions that are in the
owner's interests because wrong decisions could result in
dismissal and right decisions could result in promotion.
In the force account framework, costs are relatively low
since the owner pays no immediate risk premium and the own-
er perceives that his interests are protected to the extent
that his employees are motivated by the explicit or implicit
incentives that he provides them.
It would appear, then, that a complete CM framework
could be developed that would merge the systems analysis
concept of maintenance management, an owner decision model
to control decisions made under uncertainty, and a contrac-
tor incentive feature. Both maintenance management and
contractor incentive concepts have been and are being

applied to CM. The use of owner-derived decision models
has had successful application in industrial production
scheduling and other areas similar to maintenance decision
making.
Because of the risk premium involved in fixed-price
contracts most CM clients procure CM through cost-plus
agreements and protect their interests by maintaining direct
control over work scheduling or providing direct supervision
of contractor forces. Even with CM agreements that include
the features of maintenance management and contractor in-
centive, the owners feel that they must maintain control
over work priority assignment in order to protect their in-
terests. Indeed, most of the criticism of the complete
contractual maintenance concept centers around one issue
i
How to resolve autonomous contractor decisions with owner
(2)interests. '
It is reasonable to assert that the merging of the
concepts of maintenance management, owner-derived decision
model, and contractor incentive into a single contract frame-
work will provide a framework superior to the existing cost-
plus framework for the following reasons t
(a) most existing frameworks provide no ceiling on
costs, proposed framework will;
(b) existing frameworks require active owner super-
vision of contractor forces to protect his interests, pro-

posed framework would disengage owner from contractor; and
(c) most existing frameworks provide little incen-
tive for contractor to improve plant performance, proposed
framework will.
The literature contains much information on the
theory of maintenance management and incentive contracts.
Since these subjects are adequately covered elsewhere, it
is the purpose of this thesis to develop a CM work priority
assessment and scheduling model that will approach a resol-
ution of the contractor decision versus owner interests
dilemma. Additionally, the rationale for merging the con-
cepts of maintenance management, decision model, and con-
tractor incentive into a comprehensive improved CM framework
will be developed and recommendations made for implementation.
1.2 Objective
The objective of this thesis is to develop a work
priority assessment model for a complete contractual maint-
enance agreement for the maintenance of a 750,000 gallon-
per-day multistage flash evaporator. The role of the model
in melding the systems analysis concepts of maintenance
management and the motivational concepts of contractor in-




The contractual maintenance dilemma as perceived by
a client was best expressed by Mr. Donald Wanner, Chief
Engineer, Columbia Nitrogen Corp., during a round table
discussion of the pros and cons of CM in which he saidi'-^
"The discussion here stresses the fact that
the owner must maintain some continuity for
control purposes in The maintenance opera-
tion. This almost demands that we go the
route of sometning less than total CM. Only
in this way can you have the necessary inter-
face between the contractor and the owner to
the extent that the owner can maintain the
direction and control of the overall mainte-
nance function and the contractor can handle
the day-to-day situations."
Although there is a propensity on the part of many plant
owners to procure complete CM services, they often fall
short of their desires because of issues similar to the ones
raised by Mr. Wanner. In general, plant owners are advised
to enter CM agreements only if the maintenance work being
. . (k)
considered meets the following conditions:
(a) work under consideration can be identified by
some measurable unit (cubic yard, etc.) to enable a contrac-
tor to formulate a bid;
(b) the work can be estimated in advance to insure
that bids received are reasonable;
(c) the work can be described adequately by a set
of plans and specifications;

(d) the work can be scheduled, and contract time
calculated?
(e) technical expertise is available among possible
successful bidders;
(f) a demand exists for the contractor industry to
enter into maintenance contracts.
The usual result has been that plant owners are un-
able to fulfill one or more of the conditions and they re-
sort to something less than complete CM as supported by Mr.
Wanner' s statement.
The most common CM framework used is the maintenance
management approach with owner control of work priorities
and a cost-plus pricing arrangement. This approach provides
little incentive for cost reduction, efficiency, or per-
formance improvements, and requires the owner's direct par-
ticipation in the day to day maintenance activity of the
contractor.
The significance of this study is that it proposes
a way to extract the owner from involvement in the day to
day plant maintenance activity and to provide motivation
for the contractor to reduce costs and improve efficiency
and plant performance. The system proposed in this study
offers a viable alternative to the labor brokerage or owner
supervision agreements usually entered when a firm perform-
ance specification for CM cannot be produced. The most
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significant feature of the model developed in this work is
that when considered in the context of complete CM it ap-
proaches a resolution of the autonomous contractor decisions
versus owner interests dilemma.
In developing the model and framework for complete
CM, the three basic components proposed for complete CM,
i.e., maintenance management, decision model, and contrac-
tor incentive have each been used in situations applicable
to plant maintenance. Although maintenance management and
contractor incentives have been used directly in maintenance
contracts, there is no evidence that an owner-derived deci-
sion model has been used in CM. However, owner-derived
decision models have been successfully used in industrial
production scheduling and it is therefore reasonable to as-
sert that similar models can be applicable to maintenance
scheduling. Since there is no evidence that a practical
application of the owner-derived decision model concept
has been made in CM no direct data can be provided to sup-
port the contention that such a model can protect the own-
er's interests.
Without prima facie evidence, however, a strong
case can still be made in support of the owner-derived
model concept in CM based on successful applications of
such models in other areas. It shall be asserted in this
thesis that maintenance decision making is not unlike any
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other type of decision making. The decision maker first
searches the environment for alternative situations calling
for decisions, he plans for the acquisition of resources
necessary to satisfy each alternative, then he selects an
optimal act from the set of alternatives for accomplishment.
Managers follow this procedure in maintenance management,
production control, and any other scheduling process, It
seems logical to assert, then, that if a particular deci-
sion making concept has proven useful in one scheduling
process, then, it should tend to be equally useful in a
similar process.
Based on the rationale presented above, the owner-
derived decision model is considered a viable concept for
CM insofar as it has been used successfully in industrial
production scheduling. An in-depth analysis of the owner-
derived model and the viability of such models is presented
in Chapters 4 and 5»
1.4 Methodology
A firsthand knowledge of the administrative prob-
lems and deficiencies encountered with maintenance contracts
was obtained during an assignment involving the administra-
tion of the operation and maintenance contract for the Com-
bined Seawater Conversion and Power Plant, Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, from 1971 to 1973. This experience indicated that
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the contract client (the U.S. Navy) desired a complete con-
tractual maintenance service, but fell short of this goal
due to the administrative difficulties that arose from the
ambiguity inherent in allowing autonomous contractor sched-
uling decisions and at the same time attempting to ensure
that plant maintenance policy was fulfilled. Subsequent
research has determined that the desire for complete CM
services is widespread but that the procurement of these
services is impeded by the same dilemma that faced the Navy
at the Guantanamo plant.
This work proposes a possible way to resolve the
dilemma faced by CM clients. Based on the experience with
the Guantanamo contract, research was conducted into the
overall magnitude of the problem as follows i
(a) current literature including trade journals,
publications of professional societies, periodicals, and
textbooks was reviewed;
(b) interviews with engineers and managers at the
federal and local levels and with industry were conducted;
(c) a review was made of the lessons learned from
the Guantanamo contract.
The system for a resolution of the CM problem is developed
using proven maintenance management, decision theory, and
contractual incentive principles derived from research in




Chapter 2 provides the background for the thesis
and qualitatively defines the current contract maintenance
dilemma. Chapter 3 provides the reader with an introduc-
tion to maintenance management and describes a proposed CM
framework using maintenance management principles. Chapter
4 provides the essence of the thesis. In this chapter, a
decision matrix, multi-attribute utility model is developed
for making job priority decisions in the maintenance of an
existing 750,000 GPD evaporator. This particular plant is
chosen because of first hand knowledge and the fact that a
practical illustration of the decision theoretic principles
can best be made using an existing plant. It will be shown
in Chapter k that the assessment of subjective probabilities
by the contractor plays a major role in the successful maint-
enance of the plant. Therefore, Chapter 5 defines a system
of bonuses and penalties that gives the contractor incen-
tives to be honest in his assessment of the subjective prob-
abilities. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes with a summary of
the factors discussed in the thesis and provides a recom-
mended method of implementation of the system in a contract.
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1.5 Limitations to the Methodology
The contract maintenance controversy centers around
the issue of how to resolve autonomous contractor decisions
and owner interests. In order to minimize the magnitude of
this dilemma, the first step toward solving it should be to
minimize the opportunities that a CM contractor would have
to make decisions that might conflict with the owner's in-
terests. One way to minimize the contractor's opportunities
in this area is to develop a maintenance system that incor-
porates programmed decisions vice unprogrammed decisions.
For example, if the owner has a preventive maintenance sys-
tem operational in his plant, the PM procedures and mainte-
nance decisions involved in PM are programmed within the PM
system. Each step is clearly written down.
The adaptation of this decision opportunity minimi-
zation principle in this thesis places certain limitations
on the applicability of the model to CM contracts in general.
The following conditions should be met before consideration
is given to adopting the model developed in this thesis
i
(a) the "plant" to be maintained is of adequate size
and sophistication to warrant the development of a formal
maintenance management program for its maintenance;
(b) the owner of the plant has a comprehensive




(c) manufacturers literature exists on all major
plant components;
(d) a complete set of as-built plans and specifica-
tions exists on all major plant components;
(e) the plant is initially in good condition so
that potential maintenance contractors would not anticipate
undue maintenance risks in the preparation of bids;
(f) either the contract is written for complete
maintenance and operation of the plant, or maintenance and
operations are clearly separated in the contract specifica-
tions so that there is no overlap or possibility of inter-
ference between the operating forces and maintenance forces;
(g) contracting out of the complete maintenance
service is not in violation of any existing fair labor laws,
practices, or agreements with labor unions;
(h) all maintenance contractors are rational;
(i) all maintenance contractors prefer more profit
to constant or less profit.
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2.0 WHAT'S HAPPENING IN THE CONTRACT
MAINTENANCE MARKETPLACE
2.1 The Contract Maintenance Consumer Preference
According to Oliverson, *-*' "There is a general feel-
ing that the next decade will see a steady growth in the use
of contract maintenance to help maintain equipment that is
continually becoming more sophisticated." Statistical evi-
dence of the extent to which contractual maintenance is be-
ing used in industry is provided in the results of a survey
of 100 chemical process plants conducted by Mr. J.W. Sarap-
po* ' in 1969. It was determined that 90;& of the plants
had at one time used contract maintenance and 7W used con-
tract maintenance to supplement plant forces at the time of
the survey. In the plants using contract maintenance at the
time of the survey, 20 to 30/S of the plants' total employ-
ment constituted contract maintenance workers.
The importance of contract maintenance (CM) in pro-
cess plants is apparently well established. Some important
questions are: What kind of maintenance service do the
clients of CM prefer? If CM clients were free to choose,
would they opt for labor brokerage contracts or for complete
contract maintenance?
In order to obtain meaningful answers to these ques-
tions, PLANT ENGINEERING conducted a contract maintenance
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roundtable in June, 1972, with a representative panel com-
posed of contract maintenance suppliers, contract mainte-
nance users, an inplant maintenance advocate, and consult-
ants. A representative opinion of a contract maintenance
user is expressed by Mr. Truett Newbrough, President, Albert
Ramond and Associates, who states: '
"This is really the first time I've had a
chance to hear contractors express themselves
and it's very enlightening. I can't help but
feel that the desirable thing would be for the
contractor to take over the whole maintenance
function and yet I think, from the practical
standpoint of xhe user, this poses some ser-
ious questions. He likes to keep that con-
trol, including scheduling and some kind of
control over stores, and so on."
Additional support for the view that the contractor should
take over the whole maintenance function is provided by
(7)Rohrmann: % '
"At Getty Oil's Delaware City Refinery, con-
tract maintenance is considered a professional
service that supplies an adequately skilled
labor pool, experienced engineering facilities
and many other types of necessary, allied ser-
vices. This definition is given to eliminate
any confusion with the 'labor broker' who mere-
ly supplies manpower for disposition by the
client's supervisory force supplementing the
existing maintenance force for intermittent
periods."
Existing maintenance contracts are lauded for the degree to
which they approach complete CM by Grey/ ' Oliverson, ^ ]
and Flesca. °' Most significantly, RCA's services division
anticipates a broad market for a complete CM service and has




There appears to be a strong preference for complete
CM services by many users. Although many owners are deter-
red from procuring complete CM because of the contractor
scheduling decision dilemma, there is evidence that existing
practices and attitudes are changing and the trend is toward
complete CM.
2.2 Existing Practices and Attitudes
Much of the literature on contractual maintenance is
devoted to establishing necessary conditions and restrictions
that must be met before a plant owner should make a con-
. . . (k) (12)tractmg-out decision. Price v ' and Corsano v ' recommend
the following:
"(a) work under consideration needs to be
identified by some measurable unit (cubic
yard, etc.) to enable a contractor to form-
ulate a bid;
(b) the work must be capable of being esti-
mated in advance to insure that bids received
are reasonable;
(c) the work must be capable of being de-
scribed adequately by a set of plans and
specifications
;
(d) the work must be capable of being sched-
uled, and the contract time must be calcu-
lated;
(e) technical expertise must be available
among possible successful bidders;
(f) a demand must exist for the contractor
industry to enter into maintenance contracts."
•
. (13)Martin J analyzes present contracting practices
for the Department of Pub.lic tforks, City of Fresno, Cali-
fornia, and cites specific examples that show that the city
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of Fresno considers the six principles listed in making con-
tracting-out decisions. Previous bad experience in dealing
with the contractor decisions versus owner interests dilem-
ma is evident in the following statement by Mr. Martini
"...How does the maintenance manager know
whether a specialty contractor (elevators
or air conditioning, for example) is sim-
ply replacing parts, rather than really
diagnosing trouble, whether he is doing the
preventative maintenance necessary to obtain-
ing maximum equipment life, and whether he
has really tuned the equipment for optimum
input-output ratios? fie have had some bad
experience with outside maintenance contracts
on vehicles in which the contractor was mak-
ing decisions based too much on what was
needed to get him through the period of the
contract. . .Can we permit a contractor to
make economic decisions for us regarding 1
parts and schedules, and can we retain maint-
enance management personnel sufficiently
knowledgeable on all technical details of a
contract operation to protect the agency's
interests? The career service public employ-
ee must live with and be responsible for the
results of his decisions, but most contracts
are for fairly short periods."
Most plant owners share Mr. Martin's concern over
the contractor scheduling dilemma. However, the expected
advantages of complete CM services to plant owners has pro-
vided impetus to a movement to circumvent the contractor
scheduling dilemma. The literature contains evidence that
many plant owners are finding it advantageous to innovate
new contracting approaches in order to procure complete CM
services when one or more of the stated conditions for con-
tracting-out cannot be met. A review of journal publica-
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tions on several innovative contracts was conducted to
determine if any innovative features were in common among
the contracts or if each plant owner had developed a tech-
nique that was suitable to fulfill only his specific needs.
It was found that all of the surveyed successful complete
CM contracts have one thing in commoni The specification
of the principles of maintenance management as part of the
contract.
(I**)01iverson v ' cites NASA's CM contract with Mason-
Rust at the Michoud base in New Orleans. Mason-Rust per-
forms the following services at the base: maintenance,
engineering, utilities, transportation, port operations,
safety and security, photography, reproduction, communica-
tions, medical, food and custodial service, supply, procure-
ment, property records, and waste disposal.
The contract includes the following specific mainte-
nance management features: preventive maintenance program,
planning and scheduling of work, technical field assistance,
and cost control. On general repair work, no work request
form is required — Mason-Rust automatically moves in and
does the job. When modifications are desired to improve
tenant capabilities, a standard work order form is sent to
the Mason-Rust Division Manager's office where it is evalu-
ated for justification. If it is determined that the work
is justified it is planned and estimated and sent to NASA's
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facilities office for final approval. The division mana-
ger, Mr. H.C. Bradford, states: ^^
"The most important reason for the success of
our operation is people. Get them enthusias-
tic, get them involved, and no job is too big.
Remember, no person is completely self-suffi-
cient... We have to have the help of others to
do our job well. This goes up the line right
to our general manager."
Although the contract is apparently cost-plus the
above statement would indicate that NASA's interests are
protected to the extent that Mason-Rust needs to maintain
good will. The incentive to do a good job for NASA is bas-
ically due to the need of the Mason-Rust personnel to be
important to the functions supported.
Rohrmann cites the CM contract at Getty Oil's
Delaware City Refinery. Specific maintenance management
principles included in the contract are: a formal work ord-
er system which requires a Getty supervisor's approval be-
fore any work can proceed by the contractor; a planning and
scheduling system, operated jointly, that insures efficient
and economical usage of men, equipment, and material; a
daily labor cost report that permits a comparison of actual
performance against estimates; work sampling taken on a ran-
dom basis jointly by Getty Oil and the contractor to check
productivity; random checking of schedules to prove their
effectiveness. Although the Getty Oil contract is cost-
plus a percentage fee, Mr. Rohrmann suggests that the con-
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tractor has the incentive to do a good job through the pos-
sibility of losing the contract if he does not.
(17)Grey N provides suggestions on developing a main-
tenance management contract based on his experience with
Oxochem Enterprise, Ponce, Puerto Rico. A key suggestion
by Mr. Grey is that a performance award feature be included
in the contract. He says:
"Develop a list of performance elements that
you, your staff and your contractor consider
to be important as indicators of good mainte-
nance. Three or four basic divisions such as
Planning, Management, Craft Skills, and Turn-
around Execution can be broken down into sub-
elements. Assign weights to each element, with
a total of 100. The final cumulative score will
be something below 100 percent and can be used
as a basis for an additional performance bonus."
Mr. Grey has found CM rewarding. He feels that the more
responsibility you assign your contractor with proper re-
wards for performance, the more efficiently he will perform.
Flesca ' cites maintenance management princi-
ples as features of an effective CM contract based on his
experience as manager of contract maintenance for Catalytic,
Inc., Philadelphia, Pa. He states:
"In the final analysis, the short and long
term success of a maintenance program will
depend on how well the fundamentals of good
maintenance practice are applied. Invari-
ably, excessive maintenance costs are di-
rectly related to the abuse of basic elements
of good practices, such as:
1. A work request system for job delinea-
tion and authorization.
2. A work planning function to chart the
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course for maintenance activities.
3. A priority system to control work
sequence.
4. A maintenance department budget.
5. A schedule to relate total authorized
tasks to priorities, time, equipment out-
age, and available manpower, and to estab-
lish a logical flow of work."
In order to provide incentive for the contractor to perform
in the owner's best interests, Mr. Flesca suggests that the
contract should permit cancellation of services without ob-
ligation on the customer's part.
The contract techniques cited all contained a speci-
fication of preventive maintenance, planning and estimating,
scheduling, and a consideration of contractor incentive. It
is reasonable to state, then, that for those plant owners
desiring complete CM services there is a trend toward the
inclusion of these maintenance management specifications in
the contract.
To gain a clear view of the importance of the inclu-
sion of maintenance management principles in a complete CM
contract, a particular example of a contract that experi-
enced an evolution from the classical labor brokerage format
to a complete CM format is analyzed below.
2.3 The Guantanamo Contract Experience
The U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is lo-
cated on the southern tip of Cuba about 900 miles south of
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Miami, Florida, in the Caribbean Sea. Until 1964, the Naval
Base had received its water supply from a private Cuban con-
tractor who pumped the water from the Yateras River near
the base. In 1964, after a prolonged political confronta-
tion between the U.S. and Cuba, the Cuban Prime Minister,
Fidel Castro, terminated the water supply to the base.
President Lyndon Johnson then ordered that the base be made
self-sufficient for water and work began immediately to
build a combined seawater conversion and power plant.
In 1965» when the plant was completed, the Navy de-
termined that because there was inadequate manpower with the
necessary equipment and skills locally available to operate
and maintain the plant, these functions could best be per-
formed by contract.
The original contract was essentially a labor broker-
age contract whereby the contractor provided the number of
personnel and skills negotiated for and the owner provided
informal direction. In this type of contract, the Navy was
able to maintain direct control over plant maintenance poli-
cy and provide limited supervision over the contractor main-
tenance forces. In this regard, the Commanding Officer was




It was subsequently determined, however, that a con-
tract of this type was a personal services contract and
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might have been in violation of Navy regulations against
such contracts. Therefore, the Commanding Officer was
obliged to revise the contract procedures and relinquish
plant maintenance control and work force supervision to
contractor management.
Since the contractor was thereby controlling plant
maintenance with no guidelines to protect the Navy's inter-
ests in the plant, it was recognized that a plant manual was
required to outline specific maintenance procedures to be
followed by the contractor. In 1968, a 5-volume plant man-
ual was written, under separate contract, and when completed
it contained all operation and maintenance procedures to be
performed by the contractor. The plant manual was made a
part of the contract.
The contract had then evolved from the labor broker-
age format through a stage in which the contractor controlled
maintenance with minimum formal contractual guidelines to a
stage in which the contractor controlled maintenance but in
accordance with formal procedural guidelines. A key element
was still missing: There was no formal maintenance manage-
ment program specified in the plant manual.
By 1971. an extensive backlog of maintenance and
repair work had developed in the plant. However, the con-
tractor was not formally planning and scheduling work and
there was no explicit quantitative indication of the extent
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of the backlog. The plant owner had received no management
reports clearly indicating the amount of resources that
should be allocated to plant maintenance.
Operational difficulties directly related to plant
maintenance deficiencies were experienced in 1972 and a
study team was dispatched by the plant owner to determine
the causes of the problem and make recommendations for the
correction of deficiencies. A major recommendation from the
final report of the team was the following i ( '
"1. Rewrite Section II of the Desal Plant
Contract to require the contractor to or-
ganize to fulfill the following maintenance
management functions:
(a) continuous inspection;
(b) planning and estimating;




This recommendation stemmed from the finding of the study
team that the contractor was not performing maintenance
management and that maintenance deficiencies were a direct
result of that fact.
The fiscal year ?k contract was written to include
the six features recommended and action was immediately
taken to update the plant manual to include a preventive
maintenance inspection system and a formal maintenance man-
agement program. Current indications are that due to the
implementation of formal maintenance management procedures
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in the contract and the fact that the contractor is obliged
to follow those procedures, the plant is now being main-
( 21)tained at a satisfactory level of maintenance. '
The Guantanamo contract experience provides testi-
mony to the fact that when complete CM is desired by the
owner of a plant, the basic principles of maintenance man-
agement must be made a part of the contract specification.
This statement is further supported by the successful com-
plete CM practices of NASA, Getty Oil, Oxochem, and Cataly-
tic, Inc., cited in Section 2.2. In this regard, it seems
appropriate to develop a comprehensive definition of com-
plete contractual maintenance in order to crystallize the
facts determined thus far and establish a unified basis for
understanding throughout the remainder of this thesis.
2,k Complete Contract Maintenance: A Definition
As supported by the facts stated above, the princi-
ples of maintenance management are so basic to the success-
ful long-run maintenance of a facility that it is logical to
define complete contract maintenance to include these prin-
ciples. Therefore, complete contract maintenance is defined
as the procurement by contractual agreement of the following
services:
(a) the continuous preventive maintenance inspection
of all plant facilities and generation of inspection reports
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on all major defects;
(b) the planning and estimating of the correction
of all reported defects;
(c) the formal scheduling of the correction of de-
fects in accordance with owner policy and within resource
constraints;
(d) the coordination and management of material
procurement, expediting, storage, and security;
(e) the performance of all work scheduled;
(f) the administration of comprehensive management
reports and follow-up.
Each of these factors will be treated in more detail in
Chapter 3 with emphasis on the first three factors. It
should be noted here that the six maintenance management
principles included in the complete CM definition are in
agreement with the common elements of maintenance management
systems recommended by Rohrmann, ' Grey, ' Flesca, ' the
(22) (21)U.S. Navy, and those systems researched by Corsano. Jl
2.5 The Current Dilemma
In order to establish a sound basis from which to
develop the remainder of this thesis, it is important to
review the points previously covered and project the logical
implications of those points. First, it has been shown that
the demand for contract maintenance is significant, particu-
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larly in the private sector, and many plant owners prefer
to have a contractor take the responsibility for the entire
maintenance operation of their plant(s) rather than act as
a labor broker. Second, it was shown that a number of plant
owners, including both public and private agencies, have
developed contracts that include the maintenance management
fundamentals as performance specifications in order to as-
sure a complete maintenance service and protect the owner's
interests. Third, it was shown that most plant owners con-
sidering the procurement of a complete maintenance service
oppose relinquishing scheduling authority to the contractor.
Fourth, complete contractual maintenance was defined as the
procurement by contract of the following six services: in-
spection, planning, scheduling, material coordination, work
performance, and management reporting.
The key implication of these points is that plant
owners who desire a complete CM service want to have a total
service, including scheduling; the owners, however, see a
risk in agreeing to contractor autonomy in the work schedul-
ing area. The current attitude of owners is that to grant
contractor autonomy in schedule decision making automatically
implies a loss of owner control over plant maintenance poli-
cy. Plant owners, therefore, face the dilemma of how to
resolve contractor autonomy and owner interests. This is
the essence of the contract maintenance controversy.
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3.0 PROGRAMMING DECISIONS: A ROLE
FOR MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT
3.1 General
Given the definition of complete CM developed in
Chapter 2, it is axiomatic that a complete CM contract will
include the six fundamental principles of maintenance man-
agement as performance specifications. It is not the goal
of this chapter to justify the role of maintenance manage-
ment in the protection of the owner's capital investment,
(2k)
since this subject is adequately covered by Corsano, '
Hall/ 2^ McGuire/ 26 ) Sargent/ 27 ^ the U.S. Navy/ 28 ) and
many others. This chapter will analyze maintenance manage-
ment as a decision making system and discuss the utilization
of this system in complete CM.
It is a simple matter to state that a complete CM
contract should include the specification of continuous in-
spections, planning, scheduling, material coordination, work
performance, and management reports, but when one analyzes
the implications of this statement several questions arise:
inspect what and how often, schedule what work and how much,
order what kind of materials, and so on. In order to mini-
mize these uncertainties on the part of the contractor the
performance specifications in the complete CM contract must
include built-in controls that provide answers to these
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questions as they arise.
The owner must provide a precise description of the
maintenance management program that the contractor is to
carry out in a source reference easily accessible by any in-
terested party. Prior to the preparation of a competitive
bid or proposal the contractor must be certain of what he
will be obligated to do should he be the successful bidder.
Insight into the logical structure of the maintenance
management program, and, accordingly, the structure of the
reference document describing the program, can be gained by
flowcharting the sequential elements required in maintenance
management. Figure 1 provides an illustrated view of the
basic elements of a maintenance management system. A review
of the sequential work flow in Figure 1 shows that it follows




agement decision process. " v ' According to Simon, man
ers approach decision making in three steps or activities:
(A) The intelligence activity - the manager searches
the environment for conditions calling for a decision. This
is analogous to the preventive maintenance inspection element
in maintenance management.
(B) The design activity - the manager plans for the
acquisition of resources necessary to take possible courses
of action. This is analogous to the planning and estimating

























Figure 1 (29 ' 30)
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(C) The choice activity - the manager selects a
particular course of action from those available. This is
analogous to the work input control function in maintenance
management. The remaining functions of maintenance manage-
ment are merely actions and follow-up resulting from the
choice activity.
Maintenance management has no unique characteristic
that separates it from any other type of management decision
making. Therefore, the plant owner can frame the descrip-
tion of his maintenance management program so that the con-
tractor initiated work flow will follow the same logical
steps that the owner would use in making maintenance deci-
sions. In most cases, maintenance management programs for
new plants are developed during or soon after plant con-
struction and are incorporated into a comprehensive opera-
( 32)tion and maintenance manual for the plant. It is a
simple matter to revise the plant manual for contractual
purposes and reference it in the detail specifications of
the contract.
3.2 Plant Manual
Maintenance management is essentially a management
decision making process. To protect the owner's interests,
it is important that as many maintenance management deci-
sions as practical be programmed within the contract speci-
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fications. It is asserted that the reduction of the oppor-
tunity for the contractor to make autonomous maintenance de-
cisions contributes to the goal of protecting the owners'
interests. Owner guidelines should be available to tell the
contractor where, when, how, and under what conditions to
make maintenance decisions. To answer these basic questions,
a unified source document containing the plant inventory and
the maintenance management program is necessary. Most plants,
whether maintained by contract or force account, will have
this information contained in a plant manual.
For an illustration of some of the information that
should be included in a plant manual, Appendix A provides a
detailed description of the planned maintenance management
system for the 18-mgd Lower Potomac Wastewater Treatment
Plant of Fairfax County, Virginia. Since the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency proposes this system as a "model
maintenance management program for wastewater treatment
plants throughout the United States, •• w ^' it is reasonable
to adopt the framework of this system for generalizations
about the incorporation of maintenance management into con-
tract maintenance.
Assuming that a plant owner will have a maintenance
management system similar to the one recommended in Appendix
A contained in a plant manual, the basic parts of the system
can be expanded for adaptation in a maintenance contract.
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It is submitted that the expanded system would have six
basic parts as follows:
(a) the equipment configuration list;
(b) the maintenance procedures
;
(c) the preventive maintenance cycle schedule;
(d) the recordkeeping system;
(e) the work input control system;
(f) the maintenance data feedback system.
The equipment configuration list, which is a complete in-
ventory of all plant components, will tell the prospective
contractor what he will be required to maintain should he be
the successful bidder. The maintenance procedures tell him
how he will be required to maintain the plant. The preven-
tive maintenance cycle schedule tells him when he is to
maintain each component in the plant. The recordkeeping
system tells him the administrative procedures he is to fol-
low. The work input control system tells him the owner's
policy in work scheduling. The maintenance data feedback
system tells him if deficiencies exist in his management of
the system.
Each of the elements listed contributes to the own-
er's goal of programmed routine management decisions and
reduced opportunity for autonomous contractor decisions.
Although this adds to the owner's protection it does not
remove the contractor's uncertainties associated with un-
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known corrective maintenance and repair requirements.
Through an analysis of the specifications contained in the
maintenance management system, the contractor can obtain
the information necessary to quantify the contract require-
ments in terms of labor, materials, and overhead for all
requirements except those of corrective maintenance and re-
pair. The owner must also provide the information necessary
for the contractor to produce an a priori estimate of cor-
rective maintenance and repair effort.
Most maintenance management systems require that
corrective maintenance work be scheduled within the limits
of budgetary constraints on the basis of priorities estab-
lished by maintenance policy. J * JJI An examination of
the philosophy underlying this concept indicates that it is
designed to optimize the decision maker's measure of effec-
tiveness, or his objective function, within the constraints
set by the budget. In this context, most maintenance man-
agement systems' scheduling elements are heuristic optimi-
zation procedures. To the extent that these elements are
optimization procedures, their formalization and specifica-
tion in a complete CM contract can be accomplished through
the use of operations research methods. That is, the owner's
scheduling problem can be observed and formulated and then
a scientific (mathematical or heuristic) model can be con-




It is asserted that it is in the owner's best in-
terests to adopt the "budget" and optimization concept for
scheduling work in the complete CM contract. The validity
of this statement is supported by the fact that most mainte-
nance management systems utilize this concept in work input
control. It is further asserted that due to the large cost
in time and effort necessary to develop a mathematical op-
timization model for the maintenance of a complex plant,
heuristic procedures should be adopted. According to Hil-
lier.'36 »
"...in addition to considering the composite
measure of effectiveness in the model, one
should also consider the cost of the study
and the disadvantages of delaying its comple-
tion, and then attempt to maximize the net
benefits resulting from the study. In rec-
ognition of this concept, operations research
teams occasionally use only 'heuristic' pro-
cedures (i.e., intuitively designed proced-
ures that do not guarantee an optimal solu-
tion) in order to find a good 'suboptimal'
solution. This is especially the case when
the time or cost required to find an optimal
solution for an adequate model of the problem
would be very large."
The adoption of the "budget" and optimization con-
cept for work input control would require that the owner de-
sign a heuristic decision model that would be used to deter-
mine the relative measure of effectiveness of each job being
considered for work input. In determining how much work to
schedule the contractor must consider the limited amount of
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labor and materials, as dictated by the owner-established
"budget", that can be allocated for that purpose. Thus,
the limits of labor and material act as constraints in the
contractor's decision process. Since the constraints re-
late directly to the extent to which the owner's measure of
effectiveness can be optimized, the owner must decide how
restrictive he can afford to be in this area and establish
finite labor and material limits to be used as the con-
straints.
In this regard, the owner must establish a "budget"
for corrective maintenance and repair and from this "budget"
the contractor can prepare an exact estimate of his effort
necessary to fulfill the "budget" requirements. By estab-
lishing a "budget" for corrective maintenance the owner re-
moves contractor uncertainties as to how much labor and
material he must allocate to corrective maintenance during
the contract period. The owner must communicate the scope
of the labor and material limits through the contract docu-
ment and integrate the limits into the work input control
element in the maintenance manual.
It is now appropriate to develop a clear understand-
ing of the role of preventive maintenance inspections in the
overall maintenance management system and how the owner can




3.3 The Preventive Maintenance Inspection System
Maintenance is the function of sustaining or restor-
ing equipment so that the equipment performs its intended
job safely, effectively, and economically. Maintenance may
be broken down into two basic types:
(a) preventive - periodic tasks of care and inspec-
tion scheduled to prevent a breakdown or prolong the life of
equipment? and
(b) corrective - unscheduled tasks required to re-
store equipment to operational status after a breakdown or
impending failure is discovered and scheduled tasks includ-
ing complete disassembly and reconditioning to like-new
status.
Preventive maintenance, then, consists of two tasks:
inspection and equipment care. Examples of inspection tasks
include looking or listening for wear or malfunction, check-
ing out electrical circuits, looking for cracks and tight-
ness, measuring clearance, and looking at corrosion protec-
tion. Examples of equipment care tasks include lubricating,
renewing seals and packing, adjusting equipment, sharpening
cutting edges, replacing worn parts, renewing corrosion pro-
tection, restoring worn areas to an acceptable tolerance,
and exercising seldomly used units.
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The preventive maintenance (PM) inspection and care
tasks are programmed in the maintenance management system
and can be quantified in terms of the labor and material
necessary to carry them out. In most cases, it is through
the PM inspections that corrective maintenance requirements
are determined and subsequently quantified in terms of the
labor and materials necessary to correct the noted deficien-
cies. The two tasks of preventive maintenance, then, play
a central role in the overall purpose of maintenance manage-
ment. The equipment care tasks act to prevent breakdowns
and the inspection tasks give an early indication of correc-
tive maintenance requirements that call for management deci-
sions.
Repeating that maintenance management is a manage-
ment decision making process, the importance of PM inspec-
tions in facilitating this decision process is readily seen.
Without the PM inspections, many conditions in the plant
environment calling for maintenance decisions may not be
discovered. If the contractor, acting as the owner's agent,
does not look for and discover encroaching maintenance re-
quirements in the plant, the high ideals of the owner's
maintenance management program are unfulfilled.
How does the owner ensure that the contractor will
pursue the PM inspections as required by maintenance manage-
ment fundamentals? In a limited sense, this question indi-
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cates a need for contractor quality control. Through the
maintenance management system, the contract performance
specifications call for the performance of systematic PM
inspections and maintenance procedures. The contractor has
the responsibility to manage his own inspection program and
present to the owner evidence of those inspections that com-
ply with the contract specifications. The owner must insti-
tute a contractor quality control program to ensure that the
contractor fulfills these responsibilities and to enforce
the provisions of the contract specifications.
The U.S. Navy has developed a formal system of Con-
tractor Quality Control (CQC). According to the Navy, *''
the CQC program "encourages a marriage of contractor and
government effort to achieve an acceptable facility in ac-
cordance with the contract documents rather than a simple
shifting of government effort to the contractor." The es-
sence of the CQC system is that it obliges the contractor to
prepare a quality control plan prior to initiating the con-
(38)
tract. Wittschiebe reports:
"...the quality control plan is really no more
than the formalization of the contractor's own
management system that the contractor should
use to do the job right once . . . >Ve will main-
tain surveillance of the contractor's opera-
tions. »Ve will not pay for construction that
is in non-compliance with the plans and speci-
fications. The contractor has but to live up
to the fundamentals of his quality control plan
to be able to see the danger of non-compliance




Experience with CQC system contract administration at the
Public Works Center, Newport, Rhode Island, indicates that
( 39)the CQC system works very well.
Although the Navy's CQC system has been developed
primarily for use in construction contracts, it can be seen
through minor extrapolations from the system that complete
CM contracts could be accommodated within the system's capa-
bilities. The Navy's CQC system revised for complete CM
contracts may be described as having three elements: con-
tractor quality control (CQC); owner inspection; and owner
surveillance of the CQC program. Figure 2 provides a graph-
ic view of the relation of each element to the other.
Contractor




The contractor quality control element can be imple-
mented in the complete CM contract by including a clause
that requires the contractor to periodically provide certi-
fied documentation that all inspections required in the PM
inspection program during that period were performed. Ac-
cording to the Navy i ^ '
HThe contractor has the responsibility to
inspect his own work and present for Navy
acceptance only such work that complies with
the contract plans and specifications. The
CQC element establishes contract requirements
whereby the contractor is required to provide
significant and specific inspection and docu-
mentation to satisfy both himself and the
Navy that work being performed meets the re-
quirements of the plans and specifications."
The owner inspection element is merely an owner re-
view of the certified contractor inspection reports against
the PM inspection schedule to ensure compliance before mak-
ing any progress payments on the contract. This element
can be implemented in the complete CM contract by including
a clause requiring owner inspection of contractor reports
prior to payment.
The owner surveillance element is an informal liai-
son between the owner or the owner's contract administration
representative and the contractor's CQC representative.
This liaison keeps the owner informed of the adequacy of the
contractor's maintenance management capabilities and the
level of maintenance in the plant. The Navy describes Navy
surveillance as follows: '
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"Navy surveillance of the CQC element of the
program is the means by which the Navy assures
itself that the Contractor Quality Control
Program is functioning properly. It is through
surveillance that the Resident Officer in Charge
of Construction (ROICC) is able to determine
and adjust the degree of Navy Inspection that
is required and applied to a particular project."
It is pointed out that CQC alone can in no way en-
sure the owner that the contractor's maintenance management
efforts will be of adequate "quality" to protect his inter-
ests. CQC can, however, hold the contractor accountable for
providing the "quantity" of maintenance management effort
called for in the contract. In order to ensure adequate
quality of maintenance management the owner must provide an
"honest reward structure" to the contractor that relates con-
tractor incentive to maintenance effectiveness. A discussion
of honest reward will be provided in Chapter 6.
Through the application of CQC and honest reward
principles described above, the owner maintains a degree of
control over the contractor performance of PM inspections
in that the owner has tangible evidence that the inspections
are actually being performed. This evidence is provided
through certified copies of PM inspection reports. Through
the CQC and honest reward system the contractor has a posi-
tive incentive to diligently perform the PM inspections
since failure to do so would delay progress payments and




The performance of the owner's PM inspection sched-
ule is assured through the CQC and honest reward system.
The outcome of the PM inspection schedule is the determina-
tion of plant defects that will subsequently require cor-
rective maintenance or repair. In order to ensure that the
magnitude and quality of materials and labor necessary to
fulfill the requirements are estimated, the owner must spe-
cify that the contractor plan and estimate all maintenance
requirements derived from the PM inspection schedule.
3.4 Planning
The purpose of planning and estimating work generated
through the PM inspection process is to provide the mainte-
nance decision maker with a continuous indicator of plant
maintenance requirements and to provide a systematic basis
for workers to prepare for job accomplishment. According
(42)
to McGuire: v ;
"Systematic maintenance job planning will con-
trol the more critical elements of maintenance
work decision making. . .Maintenance job plan-
ning provides the maintenance worker with an
understanding of the work and enough informa-
tion to go directly to the job site with the
required materials and tools."
Figure 3 illustrates the various steps that the contractor
must follow in planning a job. A review of Figure 3 identi-
fies several steps that call for decisions by the contractor's




(a) secure drawings and make sketches if appropriate;
(b) identify and describe job tasks?
(c) identify materials required for tasks; and so on.
In the complete CM contract, the owner must program these
steps in order to reduce the opportunity for autonomous con-
tractor decisions. Obviously, to program design and mater-
ial selection decisions, a data base of standard design
plans and material specifications must be available.
This goal can be accomplished by specifying in the
contract that all repairs and replacements of plant compon-
ents will be in accordance with the existing as-built design
plans and all replacement materials will be provided in-kind
as specified by the manufacturer ' s literature unless written
approval for an exception is provided by the owner. Thus,
the owner makes it clear that deviations from or revisions
to the as-built plans and the use of substitute materials
are not acceptable unless he approves of the changes. The
standardized plans and material specifications contribute
to the owner's protection and help ensure that contractor










































































3.5 Resource Constraints t Establishing
the Decision Boundaries
The inspection element of the maintenance manage-
ment system generates the plant maintenance requirements
and the planning element quantifies these requirements. The
next element in the maintenance management process is work
input control. Each new job generated is considered for
accomplishment along with other jobs previously generated
but not accomplished. In this regard, the contractor is
tasked with making scheduling decisions that affect plant
maintenance.
In Section 3.2 it was asserted that the complete CM
contract should incorporate the optimizing scheduling phi-
losophy of maintenance management systems that operate with-
in budgetary constraints. This concept acknowledges that
making a priori estimates of total corrective maintenance
requirements is not practical but the concept provides a
method for approaching optimum performance within subjec-
tively assessed resource limits or constraints (the mainte-
nance "budget"). The term resource constraints is used be-
cause limited resources act as constraints in determining
the optimum quantity of maintenance work to schedule.
In order to implement this concept in a complete CM
contract the owner must decide what the constraints should
be and establish them as direct material and direct labor
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limits. The quantification of the limits should be based
on the owner's prior knowledge of the plant and his assess-
ment of the anticipated contractor risks involved if the
limits are too low. The communication of the limits to the
contractor establishes the decision boundaries within which
the contractor must operate to optimize maintenance effec-
tiveness. In this regard, it is incumbent upon the owner to
establish the criteria that determines optimization and pro-
vide the necessary incentives to the contractor to vigorous-
ly pursue the optimization goal within the constraints. An
in-depth discussion of these concepts is provided in Chapters
4 and 5.
The discussion above implies that the contractor
will be tasked with maximizing (optimizing) an owner estab-
lished measure of effectiveness within labor and material
budgetary constraints which are also established by the own-
er. The logical extension of this concept demands that the
contractor's compensation for his services be directly re-
lated to the extent to which he succeeds in maximizing the
measure of effectiveness established by the owner, i.e., the
contractor is rewarded or penalized according to the extent
of his success or failure. The implication of this exten-
sion is that the contractor must perceive a certain amount
of risk in assuming the responsibility for performing within
the constraints since some of his compensation is related to
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his success in this area. It is therefore incumbent upon
the owner to minimize the risk to the contractor by limit-
ing the variance of the magnitude of corrective maintenance
jobs that the contractor must fulfill.
It is asserted that contractor risk can best be
minimized by creating certain mechanisms within the contract
that help reduce uncertainties about unknown corrective
maintenance requirements. It has been submitted that the
contractor uncertainty pertaining to total corrective main-
tenance and repair requirements can be reduced by establish-
ing a "budget" (resource limits) within which the contractor
is to optimize plant maintenance. Uncertainty involving
catastrophic failures of plant equipment can be minimized
by placing a limit on the magnitude of jobs for which the
contractor is held responsible. Uncertainty involving the
owner's measure of effectiveness and the contractor's re-
sponsibilities in making determinations in this area can be
minimized by introducing a work input control decision model
that subjects the selection of alternatives process to own-
er criteria and reduces the need for the contractor to make
autonomous decisions.
Three mechanisms can be conceptualized as follows:
(A) The first mechanism may consist of the mainte-
nance management program and the "budget". This mechanism
would provide the quantitative information necessary for
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the contractor to prepare a bid or proposal to do the work.
The maintenance management program would be contained in
the plant manual. The "budget" could be presented by the
owner as two bid items in the contract document. Bid item
one could specify a limited (but explicit) number of man-
hours of direct labor to be used in fulfillment of correc-
tive maintenance items. Bid item two could specify a limited
(but explicit) amount of direct materials (dollar value) to
be used in fulfillment of corrective maintenance items. Use
of the bid item concept to establish a unified basis for
contractor bids on complete CM contracts has had recent
(43)practical application. Jl
(B) The second mechanism may consist of a procedure
in the work input control element that subjects all work
generated and planned through the two previous elements to
a threshold evaluation. The purpose of the threshold eval-
uation is to screen out all jobs greater than a certain
magnitude and submit these jobs to the owner for action. It
is incumbent upon the owner to establish the threshold lim-
its that he considers reasonable in minimizing contractor
risk. The U.S. Navy uses a limit of $25,000 for repair pro-
jects to be submitted by the activity commanding officer for
(44)funding and performance by others. ' This converts to




The result of the second mechanism is that it re-
lieves the contractor of the responsibility for work of
catastrophic scope that would use up much or all of the
corrective maintenance "budget" in single jobs. Since it
is not in the owner's interest that jobs should be allowed
to become large enough to be rejected in the threshold eval-
uation, a deterrent to possible contractor profit maximiz-
ing behavior in this area should be provided. The contract
should state that neither the contractor nor any of his sub-
sidiary companies may bid on the resultant work.
(C) The third mechanism may consist of a resource
allocation procedure in the work input control element that
subjects all work that passes the threshold evaluation to a
decision test that incorporates owner preferences and main-
tenance policy. Through the work input control decision
model, the contractor can make a determination of which
maintenance jobs of the group being considered will provide
maximum maintenance effectiveness as measured by the owner's
preferences. Accordingly, those jobs showing the highest
measure of maintenance effectiveness will be scheduled to
the extent possible within resource constraints.
In summary, a complete CM contractual framework has
been proposed that integrates the accepted concepts of main-
tenance management, optimization within budget constraints,
and the limitation of requirements variance to reduce risk.
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The elements of maintenance management provide the medium
through which routine maintenance decisions are programmed,
thus reducing the opportunity for autonomous contractor de-
cisions and establishing a systematic basis for generating,
planning, and accomplishing work. The budget element estab-
lishes the decision boundaries within which the contractor
must operate to optimize maintenance effectiveness, thus re-
ducing contractor uncertainty as to the total scope of the
contract. The limited variance element establishes the max-
imum limit of magnitude on any particular job that the con-
tractor must perform, thus it reduces the contractor's un-
certainty pertaining to his responsibility in recovering
from possible catastrophic failures of plant equipment.
Through the framework proposed the contractor can
assess the quantity of effort and risk that he must assume
in performing the contract requirements. The elements of
the contract assure the owner that the plant maintenance re-
quirements will be continuously generated and planned with
minimum risk to the contractor. The artificial "budget"
introduced into the contract through bid items places con-
straints on the resources that can be allocated to the goal
of optimizing maintenance effectiveness. With this in mind,
it is appropriate to determine what criteria establishes
optimization and how contractor judgements can be used in
fulfillment of the owner's interests.
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4.0 WORK INPUT CONTROL: CONTRACTOR
DECISIONS VERSUS OWNER INTERESTS
4.1 A Choice Among Alternatives
The use of the work "complete" in complete CM im-
plies that the owner relegates to the contractor the respon-
sibility for work input control as well as the other ele-
ments of maintenance management. In maintenance management
systems that are constrained by limited resources allocated
for corrective maintenance and repairs, work input control
is the act of periodically selecting for accomplishment a
limited number of jobs from the overall backlog of jobs so
as to achieve optimum maintenance effectiveness. The mag-
nitude of work that can be input at any time depends on the
magnitude of the corrective maintenance budget.
In the context of the complete CM contract, the
corrective maintenance "budget" is established by the mag-
nitude of direct materials and labor specified by the owner
in the contract bid items. Work input control in complete
CM is the act by the contractor of selecting for accomplish-
ment those jobs that will optimize maintenance effective-
ness within the "budget" constraints set by the owner. In
this regard, work input control is a decision problem under
uncertainty whereby the contractor is tasked with subjec-
tively assessing the relative utility of each alternative
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maintenance job pertinent to maintenance optimization and
selecting the jobs with the greatest utility for accomplish-
ment.
It is in the assessment of utility by the contractor
that much of the ambiguity of complete CM arises. The con-
tract is for the maintenance of the owner's plant, not the
contractor's. Therefore, the utility assessment should be
a measure of the owner's utility for each job, not the con-
tractor's. Repeating Martin's concerns: v -"
"...Can we permit a contractor to make economic
decisions for us regarding parts and schedules,
and can we retain maintenance management per-
sonnel sufficiently knowledgeable on all tech-
nical details of a contract operation to protect
the agency's interests? The career service
public employee must live with and be responsi-
ble for the results of his decisions, but most
contracts are for fairly short periods."
In order to overcome this ambiguity, the owner must inject
the various attributes of his personal utility into the work
input control decision element.
4.2 A Decision Theoretic Approach
The above analysis restates the need for the owner
to maintain a measure of control over the work priority and
scheduling process in order to protect his interests. The
scheduling process is that of making a choice under uncer-
tainty from a set of alternatives in order to achieve an
optimal solution. In this regard, the scheduling process
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poses a decision problem in which a "satisficing" x Jl or
suboptimal solution can be achieved through the use of deci-
sion theoretic principles. Just as acceptance of the prin-
ciples of maintenance management is axiomatic in the plant
maintenance arena, the principles of decision theory play a
central role in the decision processes of management systems.
Evidence of the use of decision theoretic principles
in decision making dates from the pre-revolutionary war per-
iod. Consider the following letter from Benjamin Franklin
to Joseph Priestley, the discoverer of oxygen, who had
asked Franklin's advice on whether or not to accept a new
position: '
"In affairs of so much importance to you, where-
in you ask my advice, I cannot, for want of suf-
ficient premises, counsel you what to determine;
but, if you please, I will tell you how.
"When these difficult cases occur, they are
difficult, chiefly, because, while we have
them under consideraxion, all the reasons-
pros and cons—are not present to the mind
at the same time. Hence the various purposes
or inclinations that alternatively prevail,
and the uncertainty that perplexes us.
"To get this over, my way is to divide half
a sheet of paper by a line, into two columns;
writing over the one "pro" and over the other
"con". Then, during three or four days' con-
sideration, I put down under the different
heads, short hints of the different motives
that at different times occur to me for or
against the measure.
"When I have then got these together in one
view, I endeavor- to estimate their respective
weights, and, where I find two (one on each
side) that seem equal, I strike them both out.
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If I find a reason "pro" equal to some two
reasons "con" I strike out the three. If
I judge some two reasons "con" equal to three
reasons "pro", I strike out the five; and thus
proceeding, I find, at length, where the bal-
ance lies; and if, after a day or two of fur-
ther consideration, nothing new that is of
importance occurs on either side, I come to
a determination accordingly.
"And, though the weight of reasons cannot be
taken with algebraic quantities, yet, when
each is thus considered separately and com-
paratively, and the whole lies before me, I
think I can judge better, and am less liable
to make a rash step; in fact, I have found
great advantage from this kind of equation
in what may be called moral or prudential
algebra.
"Wishing sincerely that you may determine for
the best, I am ever, my dear friend,
Your most affectionately,
Benjamin Franklin"
Franklin declined to advise Priestley "...for want of suf-
ficient premises", i.e., Franklin did not know the quality
or relative weights of the attributes that comprised Priest-
ley's utility for the outcome of the alternate acts. In-
stead, Franklin proposed a decision matrix in which each of
the important attributes of Priestley's utility relative to
the decision problem were to be listed. Additionally, the
matrix was to be formulated in such a way that the utility
of each act relative to the attributes could be measured in




Implied in Franklin's advice is the notion that if
Priestley could determine the relative weights of all of the
attributes important to him, he could reformulate those at-
tributes so that each was equal in weight to the next and
list them. If Priestley had formulated his decision prob-
lem as an equal-weight attribute matrix and entrusted Frank-
lin to assign the relative "pro-ness" and "con-ness" for
each attribute, would Priestley's interests have been served?
This concept is relevant to the plant owner's decision prob-
lem and bears upon the viability of applied behavioral mod-
els in decision making.
Bowman ' asserts that viable decision rules can be
formulated to create programmed decisions on production
scheduling based on the manager's past behavior. Research
was performed by Bowman to determine if behavioral models
could provide decisions superior to the decision maker's
own decisions. It was found that behavioral models gave
results superior to decision makers in all cases examined.
By way of explanation as to why decision rules derived from
management's own average behavior might yield better results
than the aggregate behavior itself, Bowman states:
"Man seems to respond to selective cues in
his environment
—
particular things seem to
catch his attention at times (the last tele-
phone call) , while at other times it is a
different set of stimuli. Net only is this
selective cueing. the case, but a threshold
concept seems to apply. He may respond not
at all up to some point and then overrespond

59
beyond that. It is this type of behavior which
helps explain the variance in the organization's
(or its management's) behavior."
Bowman's research shows that the behavioral model approach
to scheduling can be superior to the individualistic approach
of management. Additional support for this approach is giv-
(Lq)
en by Simon who states -. 7t
"For the operations research approach to work,
nothing has to be exact— it just has to be
close enough to give better results than could
be obtained by common sense without the mathe-
matics."
It is reasonable to assert, then, that the plant own-
er can approach a solution to his decision problem by creat-
ing a behavioral or heuristic model in the form of a deci-
sion matrix that includes the many attributes of his person-
al utility for plant maintenance and inserting this model
into the work input control element of the contract. It is
implied in this approach to work input control that the con-
tractor assumes the role of expert assessor for the owner to
assess the relative utility of each job measured within the
owner's utility attributes. To understand how the owner may
frame his decision matrix in such a way as to ensure that
contractor judgements are in his best interests, it is ap-
propriate to discuss utility theory.
Pratt, et. al., ^ ' develops a theory of utility







(A) Basic assumption 1 - existence of a canonical*
"Suppose the decision maker prefers prize tf to
L. Given any positive integer N, the decision
maker can imagine an experiment with N possible
outcomes such that, if one lottery entitled him
to prize tf contingent on the occurrence of one
of ni possible outcomes and L otherwise while
another lottery entitles him to prize »V con-
tingent on the occurrence of one of n2 possible
outcomes and L otherwise, he will prefer the
former lottery to the latter if and only if
nl > n2-"
(B) Basic assumption 2a - quantification of prefer-
"Given any decision problem with any set of
possible consequences, the decision maker can
select a consequence c* which he finds at
least as attractive, and another consequence
c» which he finds at least as unattractive,
as any of the possible consequences; and he
can then quantify nis preference for any
possible consequence c by specifying a num-
ber tt(c) between and 1 inclusive such that
he would be indifferent between (1) c for
certain, and ( 2) a lottery giving a canoni-
cal chance tt(c) at c* and a complementary
chance at c# ."
(C) Basic assumption 2b - quantification of judge-
"Let Q be any real-world event, and let c*
and c* be the consequences defined in basic
assumption 2a. The decision maker can quan-
tify his judgement concerning 0q by specify-
ing a number P(Qq) between and 1 such that
he would be indifferent between (1) the right
*A11 possible outcomes are regarded as equally like-
ly by the decision maker , If N balls are placed in an urn
and n of the balls are red then the canonical chance of




to receive c* if Qq occurs, otherwise c*
,
and (2) a lottery giving a canonical chance
P(6q) at c* and a complementary chance at
{"* •
(D) Basic assumption 3 - transitivity:
"Let 1\ l'\ and l'" denote any three lot-
teries. If the decision maker has any pref-
erences among these lotteries, then these
preferences should be transitive in the sense
that for example:
(a) if he is indifferent between 1*
and 1'' and between 1" and l'*' then
he is indifferent between 1' and l f,, i
(b) if he is indifferent between 1'
and 1" but prefers 1" to l''', then
he prefers 1" to l'", and so forth."
(E) Basic assumption k - substitution of prizes:
"Let a lottery be modified by replacing
just one of its prizes with another. If
the decision maker is indifferent between
the original and new prizes, he should be
indifferent between the original and modi-
fied lotteries."
Decision problems normally call for a choice among
several acts when the consequence of one or more of these
acts depends on which one of a set of possible events oc-
curs. Using the Pratt assumptions as a basis, it is rea-
sonable to assert that the decision maker must make two sets
of preliminary evaluations in order to approach a solution
to the problem. He must on one hand quantify his judgements
about the possible events by assigning to each event 0i in
a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive list
©It • •
•
t®i» • • • »9n a judgemental probability PCe^). He
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must on the other hand quantify his preferences among con-
sequences by choosing appropriate reference consequences c*
and c# and then assigning to every consequence c^ a number
Tr(ci) such that he would be indifferent between c^ for cer-
tain and a lottery giving a canonical chance tt(c^) at c* and
a complementary chance at c# . Given the assessments P(9j_)
and Tr(ci) ^ i- s readily seen that the value or weighted pref-
erence of each act can be computed: (50)
TT = Z L Tr(c i )P(9 i ) (1)
Capital pi (ff) exhibits the canonical chance that the deci-
sion maker would take in order to get the prize c* with a
complementary chance at c* . This concept can be illustrated
as follows:
SSJ (2)
Real lottery Simple canonical lottery
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Clearly, the concepts of c* and c# are introduced to
overcome the inability of the decision maker to attach car-
dinal utility to a consequence, c* and c* establish a basis
for ordinal preference ordering of consequences through what
Thompson^ calls a "preference yardstick". In this regard,
c* is assigned the value 1 (the top of the yardstick) be-
cause it is at least as good as any of the possible conse-
quences anticipated. The value 1, then, is an ordinal value
signifying that a consequence is as good as the best.
Since these values are ordinal, then their relative
standing cannot be changed by adding to or multiplying their
values by a positive constant or constants. In this regard,
Prattw asserts that utilities are "indifferent up to a
linear transformation", i.e., their relative standings will
not be changed by a linear operation.
Assume that the decision maker's utility for a con-
sequence Ci can be expressed as follows:^-3 '
u(c^) = a + bTt(ci), then,
U = ^uCci) ?(d L )
= 2
i
[a + bTr(ci)] P(9 i )
= a Z i PO^ + b 2 i TT(c i ) P(6i)
= a * bTT (3)
a and b are positive linear transformations and TT is a util-
ity function. Since it involves the application of the

6^
judgemental probability, P(6i),TTis the "expected" utility
of the act or lottery considered.
Arroww ^' asserts that utilities can be summed and
averaged. If TTcan be determined for each attribute of a
decision maker's personal utility pertaining to a choice
among alternatives, then it follows that the sum of TT's
across the attributes for each alternative will provide an
index of the decision maker's aggregate utility for that al-
ternative. From this statement it becomes apparent that if
a decision maker can list the attributes that make up his
personal utility for an act and for each of the attributes
evaluate the preference for consequences and probability of
occurrence of events resulting from the act, then his ex-
pected utility for the act can be computed.
The two aspects discussed above that speak directly
to the decision maker's utility are (a) the attributes with-
in which the aggregate utility is measured and (b) the
preference for consequences of possible events stemming
from each alternate act. The subjective probability as-
pect of the decision maker's utility merely "weights" it,
i.e., converts it to expected utility. Since the plant
owner's goal is to inject his personal utility into the
work input control element, it appears that one way would
be to segregate the attributes and preference aspects from
the subjective probability aspect and program the two for-
mer aspects into a decision matrix for work input control.
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With the proper incentives to engender honesty, the subjec-
tive probability aspect of the owner's utility can be left
for the contractor's assessment.
In order to program the different attributes of his
utility for maintenance into a decision matrix, the owner
can develop a multi-attribute utility (MAU) model that de-
fines the various dimensions of his utility framework. Much
is written on the eliciting of MAU models from the decision
maker. Huberw ' states:
"Two tasks that decision science consultants
are often given are (1) to generate a list
of alternatives for top-level decision mak-
ers to choose from, and (2) to help these
decision makers make choices. In the first
case, the consultant wants to be able to
develop and screen in alternatives that will
be highly valued, and to screen out alterna-
tives that will not. In this case, he attempts
to simulate the implicit model that the deci-
sion maker actually uses. In the second case
he wants to be able to improve the decision
maker's evaluation model (and also, of course,
the decision process) . In this case he at-
tempts to approximate the model that the de-
cision maker wants to use."
It is noted that MAU's are numbers that represent the util-
ity or satisfaction associated with an item, outcome, or
alternative having more than one valued property (attri-
bute) . Referring to the discussion of utility theory de-
veloped earlier it is clear that MAU's are the summation of




for each particular attribute. In the context of the plant
owner's goal of injecting his utility into the work input
control element, the MAU model must be formulated in such
a way that the owner's preferences are integrated into the
evaluation model.
In the MAU model, preferences appear in two areas:
(a) the relative weight or importance attached to each at-
tribute in the MAU model, and (b) the preference for conse-
quences of possible events stemming from the alternate acts.
In order to create a model devoid of ambiguity it is impor-
tant that the preference for each attribute be programmed
within the model. MacCrimmon, et.al., ^' states:
"To make a rational decision, the decision
maker must choose in accordance with his
preferences. Since these preferences re-
side within the head of the decision maker,
they are not apparent to an external ob-
server, and they may not be clearly known
by the decision maker himself. One prac-
tical way to think about these preferences
is to express them in terms of trade-offs
—
the amount of one attribute the decision
maker will give up in order to gain speci-
fied amounts of some other attribute( s)
.
The locus of trade-offs from a given com-
bination of attribute values generates an
iso-preference curve or indifference curve
between the attributes. The trade-off or
marginal rate of substitution at any point
is the slope at that point. Iso-preference
curves are contours on a general utility
function . An alternative to our approach
of focusing on iso-preference curves be-
tween attributes is to directly study the
utility function. This alternate approach
almost always assumes, for practicality's
sake, that the utility function is addi-




In this regard, the plant owner must use the "trade-
off" concept in establishing the relative weight of each of
the attributes in his MAU model. The most straightforward
way to accomplish the trade-offs is to establish attributes
of equivalent weight. A successful practical application
of this concept is reported by Skolnick^ ' in a paper des-
cribing the Contender Evaluation and Selection Technique
(CONTEST) used by the Navy in selecting design and construc-
tion contractors. Skolnick states:
"It has been the consensus that, in very gross
terms the measure of a potential contractor
can be obtained by the resulting effect of his
proposal upon the quality indexes of cost, pro-
duct performance, and time; indeed even DOD
contract people generally agree upon the util-
ity of such a primitive reference frame. It
is not possible, however, to distinguish among
highly qualified bidders the best for a partic-
ular task if such a set of 'spatial character-
istics' is employed. As a first step in organ-
izing the matters of importance, the notion of
'Factor' is introduced. In a particular com-






"It should be difficult to make a case, that
of the four Factors displayed above, any one
is more important than another, either qual-
itatively or quantitatively, i.e., they
should be approximately of equal worth. They
are, in reality, an artifice introduced main-
ly for organizational convenience. If the
Factors are then resolved into their basic
equivalent components (called Groups in CON-
TEST), a hyperspace of N dimensions will be
produced (where N is the total number of Groups
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assembled under all the four Factors) ; these
N axes cover the entire space of concern and
serve as its basis.
"The important point to be recognized is that
subjective assessment appraised the Groups
under each Factor as equal and, since the
Factors themselves were approximately equiv-
alent, it was possible to draw the conclusion
that the individual Groups were equal, one
to the other. It is extremely difficult to
make the argument that a Group under Factor
I is equal in weight to a Group under Factor
IV otherwise.
"This is not to say that essay-like justifica-
tion cannot be presented; it merely is acknow-
ledged that Group equality, when the Groups
are compared directly, will always be a moot
point dependent upon the argumentative inclin-
ations of the critic. For this reason, it is
preferable to approach the 'proof of the Group
equality through the logic pattern sketched
above. Thus, one first displays approximately
equal Factors, then breaks each Factor into
approximately equal Groups, and, finally, in-
fers relative Group equality as a consequence
of the initial hypothesis."
Through the use of the CONTEST "equivalent factor"
method of building the owner's KAU model the problem of
attribute preference is resolved, The second preference
factor, that of preference for consequences, can also be
entered into the MU model with relative ease.
In injecting his preference into the work input con-
trol element the owner is interested in ensuring that only
those jobs are selected for accomplishment that will opti-
mize his measure of effectiveness, i.e., provide the maximum
MAU. Since several alternatives are considered at the same
time the simple test of the best alternative is that it is
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clearly superior to all of the rest in terms of maintenance
effectiveness. A more comprehensive test for each alterna-
tive as it would apply to each specific attribute in the
MAU model would be "is it clearly superior to the •norm' of
the other alternatives". This test is less restrictive
than the first. It is seen, then, that the decision prob-
lem is a dichotomy in which the best prize (c*) is the con-
sequence of the event that maintenance effectiveness im-
proved greater than the average alternative could have pro-
vided and the least prize (c # ) is the consequence of the
event that maintenance effectiveness did nox improve greater
than the average alternative could have provided. From the
Pratt basic assumption 2a pertaining to utility theory it
is clear that the owner's preference for the best prize,
tt(c*), is assigned the value 1 and his preference for the
least prize, tt(c»), is assigned the value 0.
Visualize, now, a matrix containing all of the
equal weight attributes of the owner's MAU listed along the
left side and a sequential listing of all maintenance jobs
to be considered for scheduling across the top. Assume that
the contractor is tasked with evaluating all alternatives
as they apply to each attribute and from this evaluation he
is to assess the subjective probability that each particular
job is superior to the norm of all the jobs being consid-
ered as it applies to each attribute. Clearly from this

70
exercise all of the elements that make-up the owner's MAU




where P(9i) = probability of superiority
P(02) = probability of not superior = 1 - P(9,)
tt(c;l) = preference for superiority, tt(c*) = 1
tt(c2) = Preference for not superior, ^(c*) =
m^j = maintenance job j considered relative to at-
tribute i.
The owner's single attribute utility for m^j, then, isi
"^"ij = £i=l P(e i } n(c i )
= p(0i)(D +[i - p(e 1 )](o)
= P(e
1 ) (6)





= Zi^TTm^ = Zni=1 P^S!) (?)
Having determined the MAU for each maintenance job under
consideration, the matter of work input control becomes the
simple process of selecting the jobs with the greatest MAU
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rating for accomplishment within budgetary constraints.
An MAU model has been conceptualized in which the
only judgement required of the contractor is the assessment
of subjective probability. Chapter 5 will provide a discus-
sion of a proposed means designed to engender honesty on the
part of the contractor in his assessment of probability.
Contingent upon the development of an honest reward func-
tion for the contractor as a probability assessor, it is
asserted that the MAU concept previously proposed provides
the vehicle through which the plant owner can produce a vi-
able complete CM contract. Accordingly, the autonomous
contractor decisions versus owner interests dilemma can be
resolved.
^.3 A Multi-Attribute Utility Model
In order to visualize how an MAU model for work in-
put control can be created, it is appropriate to apply the
concepts previously developed to an existing CM contract
situation and formulate a hypothetical model. Accordingly,
the Guantanamo CM contract is considered a good example to
use in the analysis because of personal experience with the
various aspects of the Guantanamo plant. Brevity requires
that the analysis be confined to one segment of the overall
plant, therefore, an MAU- model will be developed for the
complete CM of one 750,000 gallon-per-day seawater evapor-

72
ator. The purpose of the evaporator is to provide a supply
of drinking water and industrial water for the Guantanamo
Naval Base. Appendix B provides a description of the pro-
cesses and components involved in the plant.
Using the CONTEST^" approach to developing the MAU
model the steps to follow are; (a) determine several over-
all factors of equal weight that define the important attri-
butes of the plant in a general way, and (b) subdivide each
factor into a certain number of equal weight groups of de-
tailed attributes that include all attributes considered
important for plant effectiveness. Hence, if the groups
under each factor are equal in weight one to the other and
the factors are ail of equal weight then by the Pratt assump-
tion of transitivity each group is equal in weight to any
other group, regardless of the factor.
Analysis of Appendix 3 shows that there are four
general attributes of the evaporator under consideration
that define its functions:
(a) production;
(b) quality control;
(c) efficiency control; and
(d) corrosion control or reliability.
It is difficult to make a case that any one of these factors
is more important to the overall effectiveness of the plant
than any other. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that
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the plant owner may be indifferent in his preferences among
the four attributes. These four attributes, then, are cho-
sen as the major factors in the CONTEST MAU model.
Proceeding first with an analysis of the components
and processes involved in plant production, the following is
seen,?
(a) energy is boosted in the brine heater;
(b) vacuum is regulated by the air ejector;
(c) distillate is collected in the product trough
and replaced by makeup;
(d) the process is contained by the vessel shell.
Each of these functions contributes directly to water pro-
duction. To facilitate the use of these concepts in the MAU
model, they may be posed in terms of the function they serve
in production. .Vithin the MAU matrix, these terms may ap-
pear as follows j
FACTOR I: Production
Group A: Energy addition
Group B: Vessel vacuum regulation
Group C: Distillate collection and makeup
Group D: Process containment
Again, the factor of production would fail without the ef-
fectiveness of any one of the groups listed. Therefore,
it is reasonable to assume that the plant owner may be in-




The next factor to be considered is quality control.
The control of quality of the evaporator product water en-
compasses control of both the carry-over of impurities with-
in the evaporating brine and the contamination of pure pro-
duct- with impure water. A review of Appendix B indicates
that carry-over is deterred by an entrainment separator or
"demister" screen and the finished product is segregated
from the flashing brine by the product trough. The volatil-
ity of flashing is deterred by introduction of an "anti-
foaming" agent into the brine and heat recovery (seawater)
is contained within the heat recovery tubes. Thus, it can
be deduced that product water quality is adversely affected
by:
(a) brine droplets carrying over with vapor;
(b) flashing brine penetrating the product trough
(through holes)
;
(c) brine volatility flooding entrainment separator
(demister) ; and,
(d) seawater leakage from heat recovery tubes.
For the purposes of the MAU model, each of these deficien-
cies can be re-expressed in terms of the function that de-
ters their actualization:
FACTOR II: Quality Control
Group A: Product-mist separation
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Group B: Product-brine separation
Group C: Brine ant i- foaming
Group D: Product-heat recovery water separation
If the evaporator failed in any one of the above functions,
product water quality would deteriorate until it would not
be fit for human consumption. It can be assumed, then, that
the plant owner may be indifferent in his preferences among
the four attributes listed.
Next the efficiency factor must be considered. Evap-
orator efficiency is enhanced through waste heat recovery and
chemical recovery. The warm, chemically-treated brine that
remains after flashing through the evaporator is recycled
through the heat recovery tube bundles to reclaim the latent
heat of vaporization from condensing product water. The
warm brine is extracted from the last stage of the evapora-
tor by the brine extraction pump and boosted in pressure by
the booster pump. The heat recovery tube bundles, "stage
separations", D and vessel insulation facilitate the re-
covery of heat by the recycled brine from the condensing
product water. The chemical feed systems condition the
brine to retard scale formation and maintain heat transfer.
The salient features of efficiency control, then,
are:
FACTOR III: Efficiency Control
Group A: Stage separation
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Group B: Heat recovery
Group C: Brine recycle
Group D: Chemical feed
A deficiency in any one of the attributes listed above would
cause an immediate deterioration in evaporator efficiency.
It is therefore concluded that the plant owner may be in-
different in his preferences among the attributes.
The final factor to be analyzed is plant reliabil-
ity. This aspect involves corrosion control and redundancy
for dynamic equipment. The critical dynamic aspects of the
evaporator include the pumping of brine, condensate, and
product water. The corrosion control aspect involves the
degasification (deaeration) of the incoming evaporator make-
up water. In terms of reliability, the plant owner should
ensure that there are always backup pumps for the pumping
of brine, condensate, and product water to allow down time
on the primary pumps for preventive and corrective mainte-
nance and to provide for unforeseen casualties. Addition-
ally, corrosion control plays an equally important role
because without it many of the plant systems exposed to the
highly corrosive salt water environment would deteriorate
at a rapid rate.





Group A: Condensate pump redundancy
Group B: Brine pump redundancy
Group C: Product pump redundancy
Group D: Degasification
It is asserted that the sixteen attributes deter-
mined above tend to provide a thorough yet realistic defin-
ition of the evaporator plant owner's utility structure.
The views of Huber in discussing the methods for eliciting
MAU models are pertinent: w '
"A number of issues remain to be discussed.
One concerns the difficulty of selecting the
attributes to be included in the model so as
to be thorough yet realistic. This is espec-
ially important when developing observer-de-
rived models, as the list of possible axtributes
often has to be pruned to make the cognitive
task of responding to multi-dimensional stim-
uli a reasonable one. On the other hand, if
an important attribute is not considered some-
where in the decision process, this could have
serious consequences. One can think of many
ways to interact with the client in selecting
the attributes to be included, but apparently
none have been tested for their strengths and
weaknesses. Consequently at this point we must
be satisfied with simply being aware of the
problem. Hopefully, explicit recognition of
the issue will help us to avoid any major
disasters.
"
Care was taken at the beginning of this analysis to stress
that the opinions and choices of attributes were based on
personal experience with the Guantanamo plant. A basic as-
sumption in the development of any MAU model must be that
the plant owner is familiar with his plant and can organize
his opinions pertaining to plant effectiveness as specified
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in the CONTEST method. If the owner is not familiar with
his plant, it will be in his best interests to retain a
consultant to develop his model.
Integrating the sixteen attributes into a compre-
hensive whole. Figure 4 provides an illustration of the
evaporator KAU model structure.
FACTOR 1: Production
Group A: Energy addition
Group B: Vessel vacuum regulation
Group C: Distillate collection
Group D» Process containment
FACTOR Hi Quality Control
Group A: Product-mist separation
Group Bt Product-brine separation
Group Ci Brine anti-foaming
Group D: Product-heat recovery water separation
FACTOR IIIi Efficiency Control
Group A: Stage separation
Group B: Heat recovery
Group Ci Brine recycle











Guantanamo Evaporator MAU Structure
Figure 4
The model can be included in the contract posing the follow-
ing specifications:
(A) Analyze all jobs passing the threshold evalua-
tion monthly and select a job from among them having the
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greatest central tendency as regards its possible benefic-
ial effects on plant improvement in "FACTOR I, Group A:
Energy Addition"
.
(B) Similarly, proceed to select a job with the
greatest central tendency in "Vessel vacuum regulation" and
so on, through "Degasification"
.
(C) For each job other than the one with central
tendency, consider the effect that accomplishment of this
job might have, first, on plant improvement in "energy ad-
dition" .
(D) Assess the probability that the effect of the
job being considered is clearly superior to The possible
effect of the job with greatest central tendency on plant
improvement in "energy addition", and list the probability
in matrix form,
(E) Proceed to assess the probability of superior-
ity of the job being considered in each of the remaining
attributes and list the probability in the matrix.
(F) Proceed in a similar manner for all other jobs
awaiting work input control.
When complete, the matrix would appear as in Figure 5. As-
suming that an honest reward function is included in the
contract to provide incentive for the contractor to be
honest in the assessment of probabilities, the owner's MAU
for each job is found by simply summing the probabilities
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Guantanamo Evaporator Work Input Control Model
Figure 5
Simply stated, the concept of ranking each mainte-
nance job according to its MAU establishes its priority.
In many existing maintenance management systems, informal
MAU models are used to assess work priority. In this re-
gard, the concept of relative ranking by measures of utility
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to establish job priority agrees closely with the classical
concepts researched by Corsano. '
4.4 Scheduling
The assessment of the plant owner's MAU for the
maintenance jobs awaiting work input subjectively estab-
lishes the "expected" ranking of each job in its effect on
optimization of plant performance. Repeating that the con-
tract has implemented the "optimization within budgetary
constraints" concept, scheduling becomes the act of select-
ing for accomplishment the jobs with the highest MAU ratings
(priority) to the extent possible within the constraints
set by the "budget".
In many maintenance management systems a "work input
control" schedule or "shop load plan" v ' is prepared on a
monthly basis with more detailed "shop" schedules^ ->} pre-
pared on a weekly basis. Work enters the shop load plan
with "expected" material and manpower availability dates
and then is moved to the shop schedule when materials and
manpower are actually available. The shop load plan, then,
must allow for material lead times and unscheduled manpower
requirements.
The material lead time factor is a critical one for
the plant owner in preparing a complete CM contract. Since
the owner is purchasing a total service from the contractor,
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including material coordination, allowance must be made for
material lead time to ensure that all materials ordered are
on-board prior to the conclusion of each contract period,
and similarly, that enough material is always on-board to
keep the corrective maintenance forces employed. In this
regard, it can be expected that the "mean" lead time for
materials used in a plant will be about 90 days. The owner
must ensure that at least enough materials are on-board at
the beginning of each contract period to last for 90 days
and that all resources earmarked for material procurement
are obligated, say, 120 days before the end of each contract
period. The initial 90 day factor is necessary to keep
corrective maintenance forces employed until long-lead ma-
terials arrive and the 120-day factor is necessary to en-
sure that all materials are on-board prior to contractor
demobilization if he does not get subsequent years* con-
tracts.
Accordingly, the owner should specify the rate at
which the contractor is to expend the resources specified
in the contract bid items for corrective maintenance. As
a general rule, the owner may want to specify that one-
twelfth of the budget component for manhours of direct la-
bor be scheduled at the beginning of each month starting
with the initial month of the contract period and continu-
ing through all twelve months (assuming a one-year contract).
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On the other hand, the direct materials component of the
budget should be expended at the rate of one-eighth per
month beginning with the first month and continuing through
the eighth month's schedule.
The shop load plan, which is prepared at the begin-
ning of each month, is actually a projection of the long
range plant requirements. Much of the work on the shop load
plan is projected for 90 days with some as much as 6 months
away. In this regard, work entered on the shop load plan
by the contractor during the seventh and eighth months of
the contract period is projected into the next contract
period. Scheduling during the ninth through twelfth months
will be "shop" scheduling because the material budget is
obligated by the eighth month. Since materials for the
projected work should be on-board by the beginning of the
next contract period, the work plan, the schedule, and the
material availability are the basis for an explicit per-
formance specification for the first 90 days of the subse-
quent year's contract. This work meets the classical con-
ditions established for contractual procurement:
(a) it is identified by measurable units;
(b) it is estimated in advance;
(c) it is described in a job plan; and
(d) it is scheduled.
The contract forces mobilize with 90 days of work scheduled
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and demobilize with all materials ordered during the contract
period staged on-board. It is important that the owner de-
lay the final month's progress payment to the contractor
until all materials are on-board in case discrepancies arise.
This function .should be an integral part of the contractor
quality control element described in Section 3.3.
Based on the requirement that 90 days of work be
scheduled at the beginning of the contract period and the
material budget be obligated by the eighth month, it is
seen that the first contractor shop load plan (in January)
will project work beginning in April and ending the second
week in May. Similarly, the February shop load plan will
project work from mid May until the beginning of July, and
so on, until the August shop load plan will project work
until the end of March of the following year.
Work generated through inspections during August
through December will be backiogged for consideration in
the preparation of the January shop load plan by the sub-
sequent year's contractor.
An important attribute necessary for a flexible
scheduling system is that it must accommodate emergency
work. The term "emergency work" implies (a) that it takes
priority over other work being performed, and (b) that it
must be accomplished immediately. The fact that a job is
an emergency implies that it was not detected through the
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preventive maintenance inspections soon enough to correct
the deficiency before it became an emergency and it there-
fore indicates the limitations of human inspectors.
There would be no ambiguity, then, if the owner
specified that the contractor determine emergency work and
circumvent the scheduling procedure to immediately schedule
such work. The procedure of circumventing the scheduling
procedure simply says that the emergency work has a proba-
bility of 1 that it is "clearly superior to norm" in each
of the owner's MAU attributes and that it would have been
scheduled earlier if it had been detected earlier. In this
regard, the contractor is following the MAU model in the
work input control element since he is assigning a probabil-
ity of 1 to "clearly superior to norm" in a virtual sense.
To the extent that the contractor is assigning a virtual
probability to the various attributes in the owner's MAU
model for the emergency work, he will be subject to incen-
tives to be honest in his assessment of probability as dic-
tated by any reward structure that may be introduced into
the contract by the owner.
It is now appropriate to discuss how the owner can
develop an honest reward structure for the contract.
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5.0 A NATURAL IMPUTED REWARD STRUCTURE
5.1 General
The contract framework developed in the previous
chapters provides many controls and safeguards that tend to
protect the owner's interests in plant maintenance. How-
ever, unless the owner adequately deals with the issue of
how to engender honesty on the part of the contractor in
his efforts in all areas of maintenance management in gen-
eral and his assessment of MAU probabilities in particular,
the owner's interests cannot be fully protected.
It is desired that the contractor report the MAU
probability that he really thinks; he should not play games,
nor distort his "true" feelings. For example, he may wor-
ry that if he says that the event "superior to norm" has
probability P(0x) = 0.9, the owner will do some utterly
foolish thing, and therefore he might say P(0i) is 0.5 to
prevent the owner from doing harm to himself and to society.
Or better yet, he might be worried that if he says P(9i)
is 0.9 and not 0i occurs, then he will be totally discred-
ited; and therefore to hedge against this possibility he
might be tempted to say P(0]_) is 0.5. No, it is desired
that the contractor say what he really believes, therefore,
the owner must devise an incentive scheme which will make




"One interesting way to adjust the rewards and
penalties of the respondent to the interests of
the interrogator. . .is to give the respondent a
fractional interest in the business involved."
It is appropriate, then, that the owner devise a reward
scheme for the contractor that will give him a virtual share
in the plant. In this way, the contractor's reward is tied
directly to the owner's utility and when either one gains,
the other gains.
5.2 The Profit Incentive
In order to devise a business sharing scheme for
contractor reward it is of interest to analyze the various
pricing arrangements normally used in contracting. Although
there are many forms of the basic pricing arrangements, the
analysis can be facilitated by distinguishing two polar con-
tract types.
At one extreme is the firm-fixed-price (FFP) con-
tract. In this type of pricing arrangement, the contractor
promises to deliver to the owner certain goods or services
at a price which, after agreed upon by the contractor and
owner, is not subject to adjustments reflecting actual costs
to the contractor. The profit to the contractor, then, is
the agreed upon contract price minus his actual costs.
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At the opposite extreme is the cost-plus-fixed fee
(CPFF) contract. In this type of contract, the owner and
the contractor initially agree upon a fee or profit amount
based on an estimate of the contract costs. The cost esti-
mate is not binding; the owner agrees to reimburse the con-
tractor for all allowable expenses incurred in executing the
contract. Thus, the "price" in a CPFF contract is flexible,
whereas, the fee is fixed. Since the fee is not reduced if
the "price" rises it can be said with certainty that the
CPFF contract provides a weaker incentive for cost reduction
and efficiency than the FFP contract. '
All of the financial risk involved when actual costs
rise above the agreed upon costs is borne by the contractor
in the FFP contract and by the owner in the CPFF contract.
In this sense, the two pricing arrangements are polar al-
ternatives. A third contract pricing arrangement has been
created to fill the gap between these two poles, the fixed-
price-incentive (FPI) contract.
In the FPI contract, variations in actual costs from
the originally negotiated estimate are shared by the owner
and contractor. Initially a target cost, a target profit,
and a sharing proportion are negotiated. The target profit
is usually a certain percent of the target cost. Assume
that the contractor's sharing proportion was negotiated at
20 percent and actual audited costs turn out to be $1 mil-
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lion less than target cost, $200,000 is added to the con-
tractor's target profit, the remaining $800,000 reverting
to the owner. Conversely, if actual costs exceed the target
cost then the contractor's profit will be reduced by ZOfo of
the excess and the owner will absorb the balance.
Scherer/ ^ Fisher/ 68 ^ and McCall^ 69 ^ state that
the FFP and CPFF pricing arrangements are special cases of
the FPI pricing arrangement and that the entire spectrum of
contractual pricing arrangements can be represented by an
analytically tractable algebraic formula for the FPI ar-
rangement. Let Tr.p be the negotiated target profit amount,
Z the contractor's sharing proportion, Crn the negotiated
target cost, and C^ the actual cost charged to the contract.
Then, the contractor's profit, ttq can be expressed as fol-
(66)lows:
ttc = irT + Z (CT - CA ) (8)
The fact that the FFP and CPFF contracts are special cases
of the FPI pricing arrangement can be demonstrated by show-
ing the range of Z for each contract type:
Contract Type Sharing Proportion
FFP Z = 1.0
FPI < Z < 1
CPFF Z =
It seems clear that contractor profit can be maxi-
mized and/or risk minimized by the proper selection of the
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parameter Z for the contract pricing arrangement. Research
( 70)by Scherer confirms that contractors simultaneously ex-
hibit both profit maximization and risk minimization behav-
ior and can be expected to be motivated by both. Since the
sharing proportion, Z, relates directly to both of these
motivating factors, the adoption of the FPI pricing arrange-
ment to the complete CM format can provide the vehicle
through which to relate the contractor's motivating factors
and the owner's utility for plant maintenance.
By adopting the FPI pricing arrangement and comput-
ing contractor profit according to equation no. (8), it is
seen that the contractor can maximize his profits by mini-
mizing Ca and maximizing Z. It is logical that the owner
shall want to capitalize on this contractor motivation and
therefore the owner should somehow relate Z to his measure
of maintenance effectiveness or MAU. If the factor, Z, is
directly related to owner MAU then as the contractor at-
tempts to maximize Z he in turn maximizes the owner's MAU.
In this context, Z is not a "constant" negotiated between
the contractor and owner but rather it is a "variable" con-
trollable by the contractor.
In order to relate Z and owner utility, Z must be
expressed in terms of an owner-held measure of effective-
ness. In this regard, it is appropriate to discuss how a
coherent measure of effectiveness can be formulated that will

91
adequately reflect the owner's utility for contractor acts.
5.3 A Measure of Effectiveness
The adjustment of contractor reward according to an
owner-held measure of effectiveness has had extensive ap-
plication by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
(PennDOT) in the area of contractor prequalification. Penn-
DOT computes the dollar volume of construction that each
potential contractor is qualified to perform for them ac-
(71)
cording to the formula: v ' '
Q = F (G L + E ) (9)
2
where < - qualification amount,
C = net working capital,
F = assigned ability factor (1 to 12),
L = line-of-credit statements, and
E = book value of equipment.
Within this formula, the "assigned ability factor" or "F"
factor takes on the role of a PennDOT measure of effective-
ness for the contractor. To determine the F factor for each
contractor, PennDOT rates each contractor for (a) attitude,
(b) cooperation, (c) management capabilities, (d) work per-
formance, (e) equipment, and (f) organization. Each of




Si = cooperation + attitude,
S P = equipment,
So = organization + management, and
S^ = work performance.
The utiles or "S" values are weighted and summed to compute
F as follows :^ 72 )
F = S X S 2 + S3 S^ . (10)
6~ T T T
F, then, is a measure of the PennDOT multi-attribute utility
for each contractor's ability.
Since this "measure of effectiveness" concept has
had successful application with PennDOT, it would appear
that a similar concept could be applied to the complete CM
format. By setting Z equal to the factors that make-up the
owner's multi-attribute utility, the contractor's effort in
maximizing Z is directed toward those aspects of the con-
tract of most importance to the owner. In this regard, it
has been stated in Chapter k- that the owner's KAU is a func-
tion of plant production, quality control, efficiency, and
reliability. Thus, the proper measure of effectiveness for
the owner to establish as the argument of Z is:
Z = f (prod, qual, eff, rel)
.
(11)
(71)Referring to Grey's recommendationw Jl that a contractor's
performance award be based on his relative effectiveness in
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fulfilling performance elements (attributes) established by
the owner and judged by the owner, it is clear that the own-
er must establish a "benchmark" for each of the attributes
from which he may measure the contractor's relative effec-
tiveness in fulfilling the owner's KAU. He must also estab-
lish a threshold performance limit below which any further
deterioration in performance is unacceptable. A reasonable
benchmark for each of the attributes might be the average
plant performance in each attribute during the last year of
operation. A reasonable threshold limit might be set at 3A
of the benchmark. Adopting these measures as the plant ideal
and then comparing the actual plant performance to the ideal,
the expression for the sharing proportion would become
»
Z = f ( actual-threshold prod , actual-threshold qual ,
(ideal production ideal quality
actual-threshold eff , actual-threshold rel )
ideal efficiency ideal reliability ) (12)
Since the owner is indifferent in his preferences
among the four attributes and Z must be limited to the range
< Z < 1, the algebraic formulation of Z can be conceptua-
lized as a weighted average of the four owner-held attributes
as follows:
Z = ( Pa-3APj ) + ( 3a-3A3j ) + ( 5 A -3AS^ ) + ( RA-3ARj ) ni)
Pi Qi Ei Ri ^
< Z < 1
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Now, combining equations (13) and (8) we gets
irG = rrT + f( PA-3APj ) + ( QA-3A3j )
L p i ^i
( EA-3ASj ) + ( RA-3ARj )1 (CT -CA )
3l Ri J (14)
Expression (14), then, directly relates contractor profit
(losses) to the effectiveness of plant performance in the
four major owner-held utility attributes. It is now appro-
priate to discuss how this relationship can operate to en-
gender honesty on the part of the contractor in his assess-
ment of MAU probabilities.
5.4 Reward to Engender Honesty
In 19^9* Howard Raiffa^ ' developed a theory on
"Natural Imputed Reward Structures" and discussed the role
that such reward structures play in providing incentives
for honest probability assessments. In this regard, the
Raiffa theory is pertinent to the plant owner's motivating
problem and is summarized below.
Suppose that the contractor, acting as an expert
probability assessor, announces a probability measure
£ = (p]_, ... , pn ) 1 where p^ is the probability of event
Ej_, and then acting as the owner's maintenance decision
maker, he uses this distribution in the maintenance job
scheduling problem. In particular, suppose that if he chose
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maintenance job m^ and event Ej_ occurs, then the owner's
utility payoff is Uj_(mk ) . If the contractor says p_, then an
optimal maintenance job shall be chosen to maximize: '
zi=l Pi u i ( mk)
•
(1 5)
Let the optimal maintenance job, for a given p_, be denoted-
ly m°(o) . Hence, if the contractor says £ and then selects
m°(p_) and if event Ej_ occurs, then the owner's utility pay-
off is u^ m°(p_) , which can be abbreviated as Ui(p_) .
A natural imputed reward structure for the contrac-
tor can be defined as follows: If he says p_ and E- occurs,
v,- a • (7*0his reward is: w '
a + b Ui (pj (16)
for some a and b > 0.
Suppose that a and b are chosen such that the con-
tractor has a linear utility function for reward payoffs.
In this case if he really feels tt and says p_, then his ex-
(74)pected reward is: '
r (tt, p_) = a + b Z?
=1 x^ Ui (p_) . (17)
(74)According to Raiffa, if the owner uses this
natural imputed reward structure, "...then there is no in-
centive for our expert not to tell the truth, since:
r (n» I[) > r (l[» £) » f° r a1 ^ £•
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This follows readily since:
r (tt, £ ) = a + b 2 i tt^ m°(p_) <
a + b 2j_ Triu i m°(Tr) = r (n, *)."
The key implication of the Raiffa theory is that the
reward structure pays off the contractor in accordance with
the extent to which the owner's utility payoff, u^Cm^), is
actualized. In this regard, the natural imputed reward
structure gives the contractor a virtual share in the own-
er's business. In so doing, an explicit reward structure
is not presented to the contractor since he cannot quantify
the results of each of his acts in an explicit sense. How-
(7*0
ever, Savage states : wv/
"Business sharing does not present the expert
with an explicit reward structure in any bus-
iness complicated enough to provide a more
than mechanical role for the managers, in
particular in any business in which there are
other uncertainties than those about which the
expert is consulted, but an implicit structure
is as effective in principle as an explicit
one .
"
Additional writings on honest reward functions that
support the Raiffa theory can be found in De Finetti,
Winkler/ 77 ^ and Pickhardt . ^ 78 ^
It is asserted that the reward structure implied by
expression no. (1^) is a natural imputed reward structure.
In the context of that expression, the contractor gains on-
ly if the owner gains and his maximum effort is accordingly
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directed toward the area of plant maintenance of most im-
portance to the owner. The motivating factor that provides
the contractor with his incentive is profit maximization.
It was previously asserted, however, that research
has shown that contractor's have a dual nature when faced
with situations of uncertainty. ' Contractors tend to
exhibit both profit maximization and risk minimization be-
havior when faced with uncertainty. The assessment of risk
is a major component in the decision criteria of business-
(79)
men. ' In this regard, it is considered appropriate to
develop a reward structure that will capitalize on the con-
tractor's risk minimization behavior as well as his profit
maximization behavior.
It is clear that the contractor will have a posi-
tive incentive to maximize Z as long as his actual costs are
less than the target costs. However, if for some reason
G^ should exceed Ct» it will be in the contractor's inter-
ests to minimize Z and thus remand a large portion of the
losses to the owner. This ambiguity would have catastro-
phic consequences for the owner since the tendency would
not only be to minimize his MAU but the owner would also
suffer a large portion of the contractor's financial loss-
es.
In order to avoid this problem and to capitalize
on the contractor's risk' minimization behavior, the reward
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structure must include a mechanism that allows the contrac-
tor to minimize his losses by maximizing Z. This goal can
be achieved by computing contractor profit based on two
different expressions, with the applicable expression de-
pending on whether or not CT - CA > 0.
Suppose that C.T - C^ > 0, then the contractor's
motivation would tend to be to maximize his profits and he
would maximize Z in expression no. (8). On the other hand,
suppose that the contractor's costs are greater than he an-
ticipated and Cti - GA < 0, then expression (8) would pro-
vide a negative motivation since he now is interested in
minimizing his losses.
It is in the owner's best interests, then, to de-
rive an expression through which the contractor can minimize




t + (1 - Z)(CT - CA ) (18)
For those instances in which CT - CA < 0, the contractor
can minimize his losses as long as he provides a maximum Z
value.
The two expressions for the FPI pricing arrangement
previously developed provide a natural imputed reward struc-
ture that covers both profit maximization and risk minimiz-
ation behavior on the part of the contractor. The contrac-
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tor can maximize his profits or minimize his losses only
insofar as he maintains a high value of Z. In the context
of the Raiffa theory, then, the contractor is obliged to
provide an honest assessment of the owner's MAU probabili-





It has been the primary objective of this work to
develop a priority assessment and scheduling decision model
for a complete CM agreement. The significance of such a
model is perceived as being its possible contribution to the
resolution of the contractor decisions ambiguity that ex-
ists in current CM contracts. A contractual framework has
been needed that provides a low contractor risk alternative
to force account maintenance and includes controls that will
protect the plant owner's interests. Accordingly, since
the low contractor risk required precludes the use of firm
fixed-price pricing arrangements and existing CM practices
in cost-plus pricing arrangements do not adequately protect
the owner's interests, a contract framework has been needed
that contains a pricing arrangement between fixed-price and
cost-plus but includes the necessary features to ensure
that contractor decisions are in the owner's best interests.
This thesis has been dedicated to the development of such a
contract framework.
In the development of a complete CM scheduling de-
cision model, it has been shown that a number of plant own-
ers, particularly in the -private sector, prefer to have a
complete CM service but fall short of this goal because of
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the contractor decisions versus owner interests dilemma in-
herent in present CM methods. A review of the experience
with existing CM contracts strongly indicates that in order
to protect the interests of the plant owner a basic require-
ment for any CM agreement must be the inclusion of the prin-
ciples of maintenance management as contract specifications.
The decision-making structure of maintenance manage-
ment is designed to deal with the two broad areas of mainte-
nance action:
(a) routine preventive maintenance in which the
maintenance requirements calling for decisions can be an-
ticipated and the decisions "programmed" into the program
structure; and
(b) non-repetitive corrective maintenance in which
the maintenance decisions cannot be anticipated and "pro-
grammed" a priori.
The concept of programming decisions in the mainte-
nance management system tends to protect the owner's inter-
ests since it removes opportunity for autonomous contractor
decisions that may conflict with owner interests, //here
decisions cannot be programmed, it has been shown that the
owner's interests can be protected through maintenance man-
agement by requiring:




(b) planning and estimating to quantify the work
identified;
(c) determining job priority through an owner-
created Multi-Attribute Utility (KAU) model; and
(d) scheduling jobs according to MAU priority with-
in the constraints of owner-established limits on material
and labor.
In order to gain maximum effectiveness from the CM
maintenance management program it was asserted that a mech-
anism must be included in the contract to assure contractor
quality control (CQC) . The CQC function is designed to pro-
vide positive feedback from the contractor xo the owner that
the contractor is indeed performing the various functions
required in the maintenance management program. Several ex-
isting contracts were reviewed that successfully incorpor-
ate CQC principles. The contracts included NASA, ' the
/q-i\ ( $\"?\
U.S. Navy/ x; Getty Oil, ' and Columbia Nitrogen Corpor-
at ion. The essence of the CQC system is that it requires
the contractor to control his own fulfillment of the contract
specifications and to formally certify to the owner in writ-
ing that he has done so. Additionally, the owner inspects
the results of the contractor's actions and maintains sur-
veillance oyer the progress of the contractor's maintenance
management program. It has been asserted that through these
three elements, i.e., contractor quality control, owner in-

103
spection, and owner surveillance, coupled with the princi-
ple of "honest reward" the owner is assured that the con-
tractor is physically fulfilling the contract specifications.
The maintenance management component of the proposed
CM framework provides an effective means of programming
"routine" CM decisions and the C3C-honest reward component
insures compliance with the specifications. The remaining
issue that evolves from a complete CM agreement is how to
resolve corrective maintenance uncertainties a priori in
such a way that the owner's interests are protected with
minimal risk to the contractor. A method was proposed that
uses the time-proven concept of "optimization within bud-
getary constraints" for work scheduling.
In order to minimize the contractor's uncertainty
about corrective maintenance requirements, and, consequent-
ly, his perception of the risk involved in accepting the
contract, the proposed CM framework requires explicitly
that the contractor provide ? maintenance management serv-
ice that includes PM inspection, planning and estimating,
work input control, material coordination, shop scheduling,
job accomplishment, and management reporting. PM inspec-
tions and planning determine emerging corrective maintenance
requirements and quantify those requirements. In the work
input control element, decisions must be made whether or not
to accomplish each specific job considered for work input.
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The owner would desire that These decisions always
select jobs for accomplishment that contribute to his mea-
sures of plant effectiveness and do so within the resources
that he has available for the purpose. In this regard, since
it is not possible to program the work input control deci-
sions a priori, the proposed CM framework introduces certain
"mechanisms" that would limit contractor risk but meld the
contractor work input decision process to include owner-held
decision criteria. Additionally, a reward structure is in-
troduced to engender contractor honesty in the assessment
of work priorities.
The work input control mechanisms proposed for the
complete CM framework provide two functions: (a) contractor
risk minimization, and (b) optimization of maintenance ef-
fectiveness within owner established constraints. An impor-
tant aspect of contractor risk minimization is the limita-
tion of the variance of magnitude of individual corrective
maintenance jobs that the contractor will be responsible
for accomplishing. This goal is achieved by establishing a
mechanism that sets a job magnitude limit (say 38000 in di-
rect materials and 1000 manhours of direct labor) and spe-
cifies that the contractor submit every job considered for
work input to a preliminary "threshold evaluation" to deter-
mine if the job falls outside the envelope of acceptable
magnitude. If the job falls outside the envelope, the con-
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tractor is directed to submit the job to the owner for
action and the contractor has no further responsibility for
the job. The threshold evaluation mechanism has been used
successfully by the U.S. Navy in its Contender Evaluation
and Selection Technique (CONTEST)^ ' for selecting R and
D contractors and in its Shore Facilities Planning and Pro-
gramming 3ystem v DJ for managing facilities requirements.
Two additional contractual mechanisms are included
to actualize a "maintenance optimization within budgetary
constraints'* concept. One mechanism formally defines in a
behavioral decision model the criteria upon which optimiza-
tion is based. The behavioral model "programs" in the con-
tract the weighted attributes of the owner's utility for
plant maintenance and is consequently called a Multi-Attri-
bute Utility (MAU) model. The MAU model provides the basis
for a contractor determination of the relative utility of
each job considered for work input and requires only that
the contractor assess the probability that each job is
"superior to norm". In this regard, the relative priority
of each maintenance job is established based on owner pre-
ferences and at the exclusion of contractor preferences.
Therefore, the MAU model mechanism contributes to mainte-
nance optimization as measured from the owner's viewpoint
rather than from the contractor's viewpoint.
The next mechanism involves the establishment of a
corrective maintenance "budget" in the contract and re-
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quiring the contractor to select the highest priority jobs
determined from the MAU model for accomplishment within the
budget. The "budget" would consist of an owner established
limit on manhours of direct labor and dollar value of di-
rect materials to be allocated for corrective maintenance.
Through these explicit limits introduced as bid items in
the contract, the contractor has the necessary information
upon which to base his proposal for the corrective mainte-
nance aspect of the plant maintenance requirements.
In order to actualize the functional aspects of the
maintenance management program and the work input control
mechanisms, the proposed contract framework introduces the
concept of a "natural imputed reward structure" to engender
contractor incentive to perform in the owner's best inter-
ests. The reward structure relates contractor profit max-
imization and loss minimization behavior to the owner's
measure of plant effectiveness, Z, where Z is a function of
the actual versus ideal plant production, quality control,
efficiency, and reliability.
A review of the overall contractual system develop-
ed in the thesis indicates that the system incorporates
five basic features for owner control of contractor actions
and consequent protection of owner interests. The first
feature is that of programmed decisions in the maintenance
management program. The contribution of this feature to
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the protection of owner interests is to minimize the oppor-
tunity for autonomous contractor decisions.
The second feature is that of contractor quality
control . The contribution of this feature is the assurance
to the owner that the maintenance management functions spe-
cified in the contract are being carried out.
The third feature is that of programmed owner pref-
erences for maintenance utility attributes and consequences
of maintenance acts in job priority assessment. The contri-
bution of this feature to the protection of owner interests
is to inject owner preferences into the work input control
process at the exclusion of contractor preferences.
The fourth feature is that of maintenance optimiza-
tion within resource constraints. The contribution of this
feature to the protection of owner interests is that it
provides the vehicle through which the owner might gain the
maximum benefit possible, in terms of maintenance, within
the resources that he has made available for that purpose.
The fifth feature is that of a natural imputed re -
ward structure to engender honesty on the part of the con-
tractor. The contribution of this feature to the protection
of the owner's interests is that it provides the medium
through which the contractor may be motivated to be honest




A further review of the proposed contractual system
shows an administrative framework, fully defined in a plant
manual, constructed of a maintenance management system com-
ponent, a contractor quality control component, a work input
control component comprised of three mechanisms, i.e., thres-
hold evaluation, MAU model, and budget, and an honest reward
structure component. Embodied in these components and mech-
anisms are certain features that contribute to protecting
the owner's interests and other features that contribute to
minimizing the risk that may be perceived by the contractor.
All of the components are interrelated through the measure
of maintenance effectiveness, Z, as are the owner's inter-
ests and the contractor's motivational factors. An illus-
tration of how the various aspects of the proposed contrac-
tual system interrelate is provided in Figure 6.
The positive relationship of Z to the various as-
pects of contractor motivation and owner interests raises a
number of questions about the need for a decision theoretic
approach to the contract. Indeed, if the contractor is mo-
tivated to maintain a satisfactory level of maintenance be-
cause an honest reward structure is offered to him, why
should the owner want to build an MAU model to protect his
interests?
There are two basic reasons why the owner should in-
clude an MAU model in his contract. The first is the con-
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Figure 6. The Proposed Complete CM Contract System
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cept of "bounded rationality" as coined by Simon' ' but
originally discussed by Franklin. It is recalled that
Franklin said: '
"When these difficult cases occur, they are
difficult, chiefly, because while we have
them under consideration, all the reasons-
pros and cons— are not present to the mind
at the same time."
In this regard, it is prudent to provide a decision model
that places "...all the reasons—pros and cons--..." before
the contractor. The second important reason for including
a MAU model in the contract is based on the tendency for
managers to exhibit variance in their decision making be-
lbr r7)havior as discussed by Bowman. In order to minimize
this variance, a decision model that disciplines the deci-
sion process is necessary. Although honest reward might
correlate contractor motivation and owner utility, it could
not control the realities of bounded rationality and deci-
sion variance in the contractor.
Another question that arises is "if all of the ex-
penses of the contract can be identified and quantified by
the contractor, then wouldn't the contractor's expected ac-
tual costs, S(C^), approximately equal the negotiated or bid
cost (CT ) and therefore negate the incentive factor in ttq
=
trT + Z(CT - CA )?" Research by McCall*
'' indicates the fol-
lowing:
"...Because of the peculiar sharing rule that
characterizes these contracts (FPI contracts),
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it is difficult for the government to distin-
guish between high and low-cost firms on the
basis of the submitted bids or target costs.
The fact that efficient or low-cost firms
must share some of their profits-difference
between target costs and actual costs-with
the government induces them to submit cost
estimates higher than expected costs."
It is logical to assert that a potential contractor
can gain by increasing the target costs to a level higher
than his expected actual costs and therefore his profit
maximization motivation will cause him to do so. Assuming,
however, that competitive negotiations determine the success'
ful contractor; the fact that the owner has most of the in-
formation necessary to prepare a viable estimate of costs
and establish a sound negotiating position coupled with the
element of competition present in the transactions, will
tend to minimize the magnitude of difference between E(C^)
and Cm. A few areas where a potential contractor might ne-
gotiate for a higher target cost than he expects his actual
costs to be are direct labor rates, home office overhead,
field overhead, material indirects, and labor indirects.
Based on documented experience with past FPI contracts,
then, and the nature of the proposed FPI formula, it is as-
serted that Cm will tend to be greater than 2(GA ) and a
positive incentive to maximize Z is therefore provided.
A third question that can be raised when one as-
sesses the implications of the risk minimization concepts
proposed in the complete CM system is "does the contractor
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assume any risk at all for plant malfunctions?" The answer
to this question lies in whether Cm £ C^. Due to the honest
reward structure, any plant failures would tend to reduce
Z and as long as C<p / C^ the contractor's profits would de-
crease or his losses would increase by an amount proportion-
al to the reduction suffered in Z . In this regard, the
contractor does assume risk for plant malfunctions. Based
on the tendency of contractors to negotiate (or bid) a val-
ue of C-p greater than E(C^) , it is asserted that the direct
correlation of Z to plant performance induces a positive
incentive on the part of the contractor to avoid plant
malfunctions.
The questions raised above about the proposed deci-
sion theoretic approach to contractual maintenance attempt
to disassemble the basic assumptions upon which the contract
framework is based. In this regard, the interrogation of
the system foundations is an important part of the decision
theoretic, operations research, systems analysis, or any
other quantitative approach to problem solving. Only the
most unsophisticated systems can be abstracted to mathema-
tical formulae and therefore must involve human judgement.
To the extent that systems do involve human judgement, these
judgements must be subject to open and explicit analysis.
It is considered appropriate to quote the views of Dr.
Alain Snthoven, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems
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Analysis) , concerning the role of human judgement and open
analysis in systems analysis:^ '
"The essence of systems analysis is not myste-
rious, nor particularly complicated, nor en-
tirely new, nor of special value only to De-
fense planning. Rather, it is a reasoned ap-
proach to highly complicated problems of choice
characterized by much uncertainty; it provides
room for very differing values and judgements;
and it seeks alternative ways of doing the job.
It is neither a panacea nor a Pandora's box.
"Decisions must be made by responsible offi-
cials on the basis of fact and judgment. Sys-
tems analysis is an effort to define the is-
sues and alternatives clearly, and to provide
responsible officials with a full, accurate,
and meaningful summary of as many as possible
of the relevant facts so that they can exer-
cise well-informed judgment; it is not a sub-
stitute for judgment.
"It helps by isolating those areas where
judgment must be applied and by indicating
to the decision maker the potential signi-
ficance of each of the alternatives he might
choose. Systems analysis is not a wholly
rational basis for decision making or a
technocratic Utopia where judgment is a
machine product.
"Far from it. It is based on the fact that
most decisions in Defense are at least part-
ly susceptible to rational treatment, and it
tries to deal with these in a disciplined
way, leaving the responsible decision makers
more time to ponder the imponderables and
weigh the intangibles.
"...Systems analysis is a method of inter-
rogation and debate suited to complex,
quantitative issues. Systems analysis is
a set of ground rules for constructive de-
bate; it gives the participants useful guide-
lines for proceeding to clarify and resolve
disagreements. 'It requires the participants
to make their methods of calculation and
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their assumptions explicit so that they can
be doublecr. e eked; it helps to identify un-
certainties, makes these uncertainties ex-
plicit, and aids in evaluating their impor-
tance] and it identifies and isolates issues.
"Systems analysis usually includes seme cal-
culations. Where ap:r:Tria.:e, it includes
the application of modern methods of quanti-
tative analysis, including economic theory
,
mathematical statistics, mathematical oper-
ations research, and various techniques
known as decision theory. However, systems
analysis is not synonymous with the applica-
tion of these mathematical techniques, and
much of the most important systems analysis
work in the Department of Defense ooes not
use then.
"Decisions of the kind we are discussing
turn in large part en judgments about ques-
tions of value and uncertain cr unknowable
facts. Nobody claims that systems analysis
automatically produces good decisions or
that all the oecisiens aicec by systems
analysis nave teen good ones. 1 a-, merely
suggesting that systems analysis has proven
to be a useful tool which can help the de-
cision maker.
"The potential of systems analysis is great
in clarifying debate over rrcrram issues,
in stimulating and recognizing new solutions
to problems, and in helping the government
to spend money wisely. dfithin the limits
of what any improvement in -ar.ag5~.ent can
do, I believe that systems analysis has the
potential to be a most important innovation
in government management."
Within the limits of what any improvement in manage-
ment can do, then, it is asserced that the multi-attribute
utility model develops c herein achieves the objective stated
for this thesis. Accordingly, it is appropriate to discuss




The major steps for the plant owner to take in im-
plementing the contractual framework proposed in this work
include the following:
(a) ensure that the plant manual and the maintenance
management program contained therein suitably describe the
desired maintenance policy and program;
(b) ensure that manufacturer's literature is avail-
able on-site on all major plant components;
(c) ensure that the plant as-built drawings are
available on-site;
(d) determine the equal-weight attributes that com-
prise the owner's utility for plant maintenance and create
a multi-attribute utility decision model;
(e) determine the threshold limit for individual
job magnitude beyond which the contractor will not be re-
sponsible for accomplishment;
(f) based on prior years' operating records and the
owner's personal experience, determine the magnitude of di-
rect labor and direct material to establish as the correc-
tive maintenance "budget";
(g) based on the owner's preferences for plant per-
formance and prior years' operating records, establish the
ideal or "benchmark" and' threshold levels of production,
quality control, efficiency, and reliability and formulate
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a measure of effectiveness, Z;
(h) formalize a contractor quality control procedure,
including report forms and administration format, and enter
it into the Plant Manual;
(i) merge the various factors thus created into a
comprehensive contract specification; and
(j) after requesting proposals from interested con-
tractors, competitively negotiate the contract.
Beginning with a discussion of the owner's mainte-
nance management program contained in a plant manual, a re-
view of Appendix A gives an indication of the magnitude of
effort required to develop these components for the owner's
plant if they do not already exist. Because of the magni-
tude of effort required to develop a viable maintenance man-
agement program for a process plant, it has been a necessary
assumption of this thesis that such a program is in exist-
ence for performance by the owner's in-plant forces before
serious consideration is given to developing a complete CM
contract. This assumption is not considered restrictive
since research indicates that many grass-roots* plant owners
have maintenance management programs developed for their
plants during or soon after plant construction.
The implementation of the maintenance management
program in a complete CM contract can be accomplished by
*Grass-roots plants are those plants that are under
construction or have been recently completed.
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stating in the contract detail specifications that mainte-
nance will be in accordance with the procedures outlined in
the Plant Manual.
A necessary adjunct to the planning and estimating
(P and E) element of the maintenance management program is
a complete set of manufacturers literature and as-built
drawings. Although these items are often misplaced or in-
advertently destroyed in "seasoned" process plants over the
years, their importance to the protection of the owner's
interests cannot be overstressed. Therefore, an assumption
of this thesis in developing a contractual framework for
complete CM has been that complete sets of manufacturer's
literature and as-built plans exist.
In many cases, if complete sets of the literature
and plans do not exist, experience has shown that literature
can be acquired from equipment manufacturers for a small
fee. Similarly, many architect-engineer firms maintain
microfilm files on past projects and will make copies of
desired plans for a nominal fee. Accordingly, when complete
sets of the literature and plans are established, they can
be made a part of the contract by stating in the P and E
element of the maintenance management program that all re-
placement materials, assemblies, and procedures will be in
accordance with those recommended in the manufacturer's li-
terature. Similarly, it 'should be stated that all repairs
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and replacements of plant components will be in accordance
with the existing as-built design plans and specifications.
The next step in implementing the proposed complete
CM framework is to construct the three work input control
mechanisms, i.e., MAU model, threshold evaluation, and bud-
get. First, the MAU model is constructed in a method as
explained in Chapter k. The owner (or his designated con-
sultant) must determine the equal weight attributes that
comprise the owner's utility for plant maintenance. In most
cases these attributes will be production, quality control,
efficiency, and reliability. Then, within each of these
general factors, the owner must determine the several equal
weight elements that provide a thorough yet realistic defin-
ition of the owner's utility structure within each factor.
The number of elements under each factor must equal the num-
ber of elements under any other factor. Within each factor,
if each element is equal in weight to the other elements in
that factor, and if all of the factors are of equal weight,
then by the principle of transitivity, any element in any
factor should be equal in weight to any other element re-
gardless of the factor. Listing the factors and elements
in matrix form, then, and introducing probability assessment
procedures whereby the probability of "superior to norm" is
assessed for each alternative job for each factor/element,




The implementation of the MAU matrix in the proposed
complete CM contract can be accomplished by introducing the
MAU model into the work input control element of the mainte-
nance management program. As a standard procedure in the
work input control element, the owner can require that all
jobs to be considered for work input will be analyzed through
the MAU model and each job's relative priority will be es-
tablished based on the magnitude of utility assessed from
the model.
Prior to being considered for work input, each job
must pass a threshold evaluation to determine if that job
falls outside the envelope of acceptable magnitude. In or-
der to implement the threshold evaluation mechanism, the
owner must first determine the magnitude of the limits on
direct labor and direct material that he wishes to estab-
lish the job threshold. Based on experience with the U.S.
Navy's Shore Facilities Planning and Programming System an
acceptable job magnitude for in-plant responsibility is
$25,000 total project cost or approximately 1000 manhours
of direct labor and $8000 in direct materials.
The threshold evaluation mechanism can be imple-
mented in the contract by introducing the labor and mater-
ial limits in the work input control element of the mainte-
nance management program. The owner should then introduce
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procedures requiring that each job to be considered for
work input first be evaluated to determine if it falls out-
side the envelope of acceptable magnitude. The procedures
should require that those jobs which fall outside the en-
velope of acceptable magnitude be remanded to the plant own-
er for a determination of subsequent action.
The third work input control mechanism that the own-
er must establish is the artificial annual "budget" for di-
rect labor and materials to be used in corrective mainte-
nance. In the first year of the contract, the magnitude of
direct labor and materials should be based on the owner's
desire to reduce the backlog of work from the previous year
and his "expectation" of maintenance requirements to be de-
termined during the contract year. The final limits selected
by the owner will be an indication of the level of mainte-
nance that he desires for the plant. Some plant owners fol-
low "rules of thumb" in determining the appropriate level
for plant backlog ^' and correction of anticipated defic-
iencies. From these "rules of thumb", which in most
cases are based on plant replacement value and type construc-
tion, the plant owners that use them are able to subjective-
ly establish each year's maintenance budget.
Once the labor and material limits are established
by the owner, the budget mechanism can be implemented in the
contract in two steps:
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(a) submit a contract bid item calling for an expli-
cit number of manhours of direct labor and another bid item
calling for an explicit dollar value of direct materials to
be used for corrective maintenance; and
(b) introduce procedures in the work input control
element of the maintenance management program that call for
the selection for accomplishment each month, within the la-
bor and material limits, those jobs with the highest MAU.
After the work input control mechanisms are estab-
lished the owner must determine his desired measure of main-
tenance effectiveness, Z. The parameter Z must embody two
primary features:
(a) it must measure the actual plant performance
versus the owner's ideal; and
(b) it must approach zero as plant performance de-
cays toward an owner-established threshold of unacceptabil-
ity.
An expression that embodies these two features as
they apply to a process plant is:
Z = ( PA-3A?j ) + ( Qa-3AQj ) + ( SA-3A5j ) + ( Ra-3ARj )
p i Qi s i R i
< Z <
In order to create an expression for Z, the owner
should use the factors that make-up his MAU structure. He
should then decide the Quantitative level for each factor
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that he considers realistically axtainable within the re-
sources that he is making available for the contract and
establish these factor levels as the "ideal". He must then
determine a performance level for each factor below which
performance is unacceptable. This performance level is the
threshold of unacceptability. The above expression is only
one of many that can be used to abstract the owner's measure
of maintenance effectiveness in this regard.
When the expression for Z has been determined, it
can be implemented in the contract by specifying that con-
tractor compensation will be based on monthly payments of
actual invoiced cost (CA ) plus a contractor profit computed





+ 2 (GT - CA ) ; CT > CA
or, ttc
= ttt
- (1 - Z)(GT - CA ) ; GT < CA .
Some maintenance contractors consider the practice
of invoicing actual costs an advantage worthy of espousal.
In defense of CM one maintenance contractor, Mr. J. A. Sul-
(91)livan of Catalytic, Inc., states the following: w
"....Some of the advantages of contract
maintenance are noted below: 1. The
total cost of the contractor's mainte-
nance organization is invoiced, weekly
or bi-weekly, providing management with
a current accurate total cost record.
In addition, justification for certain
expenditures can be demanded in the pre-
sent tense as a matter of routine...."
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In order to ensure that invoiced items are in-place
and that the maintenance management program will proceed as
anticipated, the owner must establish procedures for con-
tractor quality control. As delineated in Chapter 3» CQC
consists of the contractor's quality control program, owner
inspection of the results, and owner surveillance of con-
tractor administration of the maintenance management pro-
gram.
The owner can implement the requirement for the con-
tractor to establish a quality control plan by introducing
a specification that requires the contractor to submit to
the owner, prior to initiating the contract, an organization
chart outlining the responsibilities of each position in the
maintenance management program, the qualifications of each
contractor employee filling the positions, and acknowledge-
ment that the procedures and goals of the maintenance man-
agement program have been reviewed and understood. Addi-
tionally, the owner should require weekly statements from
the contractor, each certified by a person designated as an
officer of the company, that each of the PM inspections and
procedures called for in the maintenance management program
for that pariod were performed as specified by the contract
and that all specific jobs completed were in accordance with
the applicable plans and specifications.
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Owner inspection is implemented by an owner review
and approval of contractor management reports, spot checks
on the PM inspection program, and spot checks on specific
jobs in progress including the performance of material tests
and monitoring as-built plans.
Owner surveillance is initially implemented by an
owner review of the contractor's CQC submittal, i.e., his
organization chart, etc. Continued owner surveillance is
carried out by monitoring contractor management, labor
turnover, trends in plant performance, and trends in actual
costs.
At this point the plant owner will have established
the following major components necessary for the proposed
CM framework:
(a) a comprehensive maintenance management program
contained in a plant manual;
(b) a complete set of manufacturer's literature;
(c) a complete set of as-built plans and specifica-
tions;
(d) a MAU model;
(e) a threshold evaluation envelope;
(f) a corrective maintenance budget;
(g) a measure of maintenance effectiveness, Z; and
(h) a CQC program.
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The remaining step necessary to implement these
components in a complete CM contract is to meld them toge-
ther into a comprehensive whole. This is accomplished by
establishing each component as an element in the maintenance
management program and entering each component's respective
procedural guidelines in the plant manual and the contract
detail specifications, where appropriate. When properly
implemented in the plant manual, the total program logic
appears as shown in Figure 6. The physical "mechanics"
of the program is described in the maintenance management
program and work input control mechanisms. The program
functions are actualized and controlled through xhe moti-
vating forces inherent in the CQG element and the honest
reward element.
When the owner has established a satisfactory com-
plete CM contract document, he is then ready to request
proposals from contractors interested in doing the work.
Since the contract framework and incentive payment features
are relatively complicated, it is considered prudent to
award the contract through competitive negotiations so that
any misconceptions can be cleared up during negotiations.
In this regard, it is appropriate to discuss con-
tractor compensation and the proposed PPI contract pricing
arrangement, Wq = Tr™ + Z(CT - C . ) . The owner's prior ex-
pected value for contractor profit E(ttq) is intimately re-
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lated to his prior expected value for actual contractor
costs and the expected value of Z . It is asserted that the
target cost, C-p, negotiated by the owner is dependent upon
his prior "expectation" of the actual costs, and further,
that the target profit, n.-p , should be some percentage of
(92)final negotiated target cost. ' Thus C^ and, accordingly,
Top are dependent upon E(C^)
.
Now since the owner has the necessary requirements
information upon which to base a viable estimate of the con-
tractor's expected actual direct costs, his maximum allow-
able target cost should exceed E(CA ) only by a fractional
amount that he feels is necessary to provide the incentives
desired in the contractor. It is stressed, however, that
the owner should reward the contractor for his ability to
maintain a high Z factor and therefore the owner should al-
low some difference between the negotiated target cost and
his expectation of the actual costs.
In order to gain insight into how much the target
profit should be and how much the difference between GT and
E(C^) should be, it is considered appropriate to use U.S.
government FPI contracting experience as a guideline, Scher-
(92)
er states:
"It is customary for the government to award
a higher negotiated target profit Ttrp to con-
tractors who bear a relatively high financial
risk— that is, who accept relatively high
values of Z--than to those who bear a smaller
risk. Although other factors also affect the
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value of Ttrp negotiated, when they are held
constant Tr,p tends to be a monotonically in-
creasing function of the sharing proportion,
Z, chosen. For simplicity we shall assume
TTrp to be a quadratic function of Z:
(5) TrT = TTT(Z)=k+hZ + mZ 2 .
Empirical evidence suggests that on the aver-
age, k is equal to roughly 6 (that is, the
fixed fee on a CPFF contract, Z = 0, averages
6 percent of target cost) . rr<p tends to reach
a maximum of about 12 with FFP contracts (Z =
1.0)."
So it would seem that a reasonable maximum for the
target profit should be 6 percent of the target cost and a
reasonable maximum for total expected profit, E(ttq), would
be between the 6 percent and 12 percent. The actual value
should depend on how much "risk" the owner feels that he is
placing on the contractor through a tight "budget" and/or a
restrictive expression for Z.
Assume that the reasonable expected value for con-
tractor profit was 9 percent. Then the owner should first
determine his estimate of expected actual costs, E(C^) and.
negotiate a maximum value of dp equal to 103 percent of
E(G^) . During negotiations, if the contractor is able to
convince the owner that certain costs not considered by the
owner are indeed valid costs then the owner should revise
his expectation of G^ and, accordingly, C<p.
When a final value for CT has been negotiated, the
owner should negotiate a value for ttt not to exceed 6 per-
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cent of C<p . Then, during the contract period if the con-
tractor maintains a value of Z equal to 1.0 his prior ex-
pected profit should be approximately 9 percent.
With these concepts in mind it is apparent that the
owner is placed in an advantageous position at the negotia-
ting table. He has much of the same information necessary
to prepare a cost estimate that the contractor has and
therefore the S(C^) should tend to be equal for both par-
ties. Since the parties are negotiating C<p, the contractor
desires to maximize the negotiated value for C.-p because of
his profit maximization motive and the owner desires that
Crp exceed E(C^) by, say, 3 percent because of contractor
incentive motives. The owner, then, should be able to ne-
gotiate downward to 103> of E(G^) , or a revised value of
E(C^) , from the initial contractor proposal for Cip
.
In conclusion, the implementation of a complete CM
contract framework has been proposed that provides contrac-
tor risk minimization features, features that protect the
owner's interests, and features that strengthen the owner's
negotiating position. It is asserted that through the
adoption of such a contract framework in future complete
CM contracts, the ambiguity that currently exists between
contractor decisions and owner interests in CM can be al-








DESCRIPTION OF THE PLANNED MAINTENANCE
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The objective of the Planned Maintenance Management System (PMMS) is
to reduce the preventive maintenance of a large number of equipment items,
many of which are complex, to a set of explicit, simple tasks which can be
easily scheduled, managed, performed and recorded. The system:
1. Reduces the maintenance of complex equipment to simple procedures
which are easily identified and managed.
2. Defines the minimum requirements of planned maintenance.
3. Schedules and controls the performance/of work tasks, inspections
and tests.
4. Describes the methods, materials, tools and ^personnel required.
5. Provides for the prevention or detection of impending malfunctions.
6. Provides a permanent record ofequipment characteristics and a
maintenance history.
7. Provides periodic maintenance summary reports to plant management.
Although the PMMS is aimed at ensuring the systematic, timely, safe and
complete accomplishment of equipment care and inspection, two factors
must be emphasized.
1. PMMS is a tool of management rather than a substitute for a manager.
2. No system can substitute for the actual technical ability required of
personnel who direct and perform the upkeep of equipment.
It is important to appreciate the scope of the PMMS. For it to be effective
in achieving the highest continuous level of plant performance, all of the
-plant equipment must be included in the PMMS. It is not sufficient to
merely attend to the mechanical and hydraulic equipment; the PMMS must
pay equal attention to electrical equipment, electrical controls, electrical
supply substations, measuring devices, meters and recorders, alarm
sensors and alarm indicators.
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The detailed description of the PMMS i3 contained in the remainder of
this Section. First, the five basic parts of the PMMS are described,
and then a number of special considerations (for municipal wastewater
treatment plants) are discussed.
BASIC PARTS OF THE PMMS
The five basic parts of the PMMS are:
1. The Equipment Configuration List
2. The Maintenance Procedures
3. The Preventive Maintenance Cycle Schedule
4. The Recordkeeping System
5. The Maintenance Data Feedback System.
The Equipment Configuration List
The initial step in the development of the PMMS is the one-time accomplish-
ment of a complete inventory of plant mechanical and electrical equipment, .
including a take-off of r.arneplate data utilizing Form Ml, shown in Figures 1
and 2 on pages 22 and 23. The resultant inventory list is then restructured
Into the Equipment Configuration List by sorting into appropriate groupings,
equipment related to each of the various plant unit process functions. Within
each grouping, equipment is oriented by a numbering system described below.
Table 2 is a sample page from the Equipment Configuration List of the Lower
Potomac Plant.
Each item of equipment in the plant is assigned a unique five-digit identifica-
tion (ID) number. The first three digits identify the function of the equipment.
Table 1 is the functional numbering system for the 18-mgd Lower Potomac
Wastewater Treatment Plant of Fairfax County, Virginia. The first digit
identifies one of the major systems in the plant, the second identifies the
•ubsystem and the third identiiies the particular function. For example,
referring to Table 1, 522 refers to all sludge pumping equipment in the sludge
thickening area. The digit 5 refers to Sludge and Scum Processing; the
second digit, 2, refers to Sludge Thickening; and the third digit, 2, refers
to Pumping. This functional numbering system was designed to be expandable
both vertically, for more complex plants with more systems, subsystems
-and functions, such as AWT; and horizontally, for larger plants with more
parallel items of equipment, or for plant expansion.
The fourth and fifth digits of the ID number specify exactly and uniquely '
each item of equipment, as illustrated in Table 2. The fourth digit identifies
the piece Of equipment within the functional unit—the drive, for example,
in a pump-motor -drive -controller unit; and the fifth digit identifies which
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Table 1. FUNCTIONAL NUMBER SYSTEM
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Table 2. SAMPLES FROM EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION LIST
1
T> £4>r»m»nt Namo T T (X Loc klion
520 sli;ocl THICKENING
521 Thickeners
52111 T.^/t l~fcick«»*r No. 1 11 J H
52112 Sl-irffC TKwchc-irr No. 2 11 3
52121 G*jr M-lor No. 1 22 J
VL12 Ciit Motjr No. 2 31 J
Ulll Cilia I>Ti«r» No. I 41 3 M
atii CS»io I>rr»* No. 2 4t 3
52141 Cr»r HtJwCfr. No. 1 41 1
52242 C*jr B#^u£(r. No. 2 41 3
52131 V«nUl»lar. No. 1 TK.cfc*r*r 72 3
52152 Ven'.ilior, No. 2 Thick«f»«r 72 3
52141 C;qj-o;. No. i 13 3
42162 Co-urol. No. 2 33 3
522 Pumpmf
52211 D.plr* _p|u- t »r Hyitia No 1 11 J L NW
52212 Dj;-lt* Plunder P..rrp No I 22 3 J. NX
52213 Uj; >« Plu-n;** Pvmp No > 22 3 2, sw
52214 Dupito FIj.-ijct ?uo-» Ms 4 22 3 X. sz
52221 l.'.otor. Pj^ip No. 1 31 3 L NW
52222 Motor, Pump No. 2 31 3 L NC
5222) Motor. Pump No. ) 31 3 L S"W
SUM Motor. Pu-rp No. 4 31 3 X SX
12231 V*r iii* r. :ris ^r^.c^r. Nm. i 4) 3 L *4W
52212 V«rio&2.4 5o«"W a«^ic*r. No. 2 41 J U Ttr
1223) ViruMl 5pr*4 Bri^.ctr. No. 5 41 J L SW
52234 Wr Litir Sp«»-i fi-OVcer, No. 4 41 J L SX
52241 Cflf Drivf. ."»o. 1 41 J i. NW
522*2 Cur Sr.»«. Na 2 41 3 i- T«r
5224) Cur Drirc. No. J 41 J i. SW
522 44 Oil- fV.««. No. 4 41 3 L SE
52251 Fed :Cticn C«»r Tio. 1 41 2 L NW
52252 Pri.clioa Crar No, 2 — 41 3 i> NT
5225) K«iuctt«* Ot»r No. 3 41 J 2. SW
52254 Kc-i^-nto* Crw No- 4 41 J L 5E
52251 Corirot. No. 1 3) 1 L NW
J2262 Coetrol. No. 2 33 J JL vx
322 43 CoMrol. No. ) 3) 3 U SW
52254 Co-urol. No. 4 3) 3 L sr
521 F.>- Mtmnmnt
52)41 IhnVeiKd 5..cri *^*fr^1.£ r imm Tiftr • 1 J L
52)21 T"lo<» Tr*»tmiit«r al J L
52)31 lnfl J<nt Sludge Clu-wd Lo*-r! R«cord«r 4) J o w
Location areas (refer to pages 5 anr] 6):
J • gludge thickening
-L • plant shop and service building
O • outside' r
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of the parallel units is being specified. The numbering system permits
all siinilar parallel units to be grouped by the first. fo>ir digits, and it
permits ail equipment which operates together as a unit to b= grouped by
the first, second, third and fifth digits.
The Equipment Configuration List, based upon this numbering system,
identifies ail of the equipment in the plant. In addition to the identification
number and the common name, other information is provided. An equip-
ment type number tells wliat the equipment item is; for example. 33 means
electric controls, regardless of the function of the item in the plant (Table A-i
of Appendix III is the list'of equipment type numbers for the Lower Potomac
.Plant). The location tells the area in the plant, the level within the area
(upper, middle, lower), the location within the area (N.~\V., S.E., etc.) and
the relative location with respect to similar or parallel items.
The Equipment Data List (illustrated by Table 3) augments the main Equip-
ment Cor.li gu ration List and is grouped by equipment type. For each item
of equipment, identified by its frvc-dieit ID number, the Equipment Data. .List
contains the manufacturer's name, the part or model number and the aerial
number.
The Equipment Data List, with the equipment type number, is useful fcT
.grouping equipment with .similar maintenance requirements and wirb similar
•pare parts requirements. This list is extremely useful in searching for
replacement units or p^rts in the event of a brcalcdown leading to an emar—
geocy .situation.
J£ven more detailed data are tabulated in a similar fashion to augment tV-»
Equipment Configuration List. Table 4, a sample list from the Lower
Potomac Plant, shows how pumps are separately listed with their head,
capacity, size, impeller and RPM; and how electric motors are separately
listed with their horesepower, frame, RP\I, voltage, amperage and number
xif phases.
2jx additi on to these tabular equipment inventory lists, which should be kept
XL a. central location, the pertinent dam for each item of equipment is also
recorded on a single sheet of paper. Form Ml, for easy reference (close
to the equipment).
Form Ml, "Equipment Reference Data, " is an 8-1/2 x 11-inch permanent
xecord for each item of equipment. Figur-es 1 and 2 show both sides of
PormMl. All descriptive data from manufactnrer'r catalogs, drawings,
bulletins and reference documents are transcribed onto Form Mi. This
form has three special blocks for data should the item of equipment be an
electric motor, a pump or a drive or reducer. For items of equipment
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Table 3L SAMPLBS FilOM EQUIPMENT DATA LIST




f«.-i.r.k. Mum )7I0 rUN10-t43u*
1)111 Fft^r'-ai.t* hijTM S71S KiMW<J*1
1)114 r4if&ir.ki Mots* 4710 K2NI0-I-4074
32111 Wti ;a Tore,*** jio* Wxkl C !!15(,10-I
22114 VeT.ea Torque * low MoJ«l C M ,S.,IC-2
22114 Vfaco Torq^* Tl&m Modal C 689SM0-I
21111 W«m<-o Torqjc Flow Vodel E <.S1*610-4
2)112 W#— to Tor^j* Flow Msscl E U9SU0.3
15111 FatrS.r.ks Mors* M^tl 4720 K2NI 044371
mil Fair-inki Vorn MUcI )7J0 K2M04437I-1
j»ii) Fa«riin*» Mjrtc Madtl )720 K2M044CT1-I
1)411 FairLlnkt Moria 1423B-2S K2M04«p;l
1*111 Fatrh&pka Mart* 54243 K2NI04 4072
11114 F» r*_ i«i Mjrn »«24-3 K2NI 044072-1
42211 F-* t'*T» tf-14-C 107-3 CJ3-0-C2
42212 F_ai**ra 0-V4-C. 107.) C's-CoCl
4221) F-» it » r-i 0-34-C. 107.3 c.'i-no)
Ultl E ft » t € r a U-V4-C. I07-) CJS-0797
42)12 Eft Hern U-)4-C. 1C7-) CJJ-C300
42)1) Eft ttrrn U-J4-C. 107-1 CJ5-C79S
4)311 Fft-rL*r.ki Moraa 34I4E K2M044CT3-1
31 Mot.ftTft. Vcxo* ««4 jimi A iirnQLlfll
12621 Vlil.rj'.o.lf TBDP »83S101C;7.6;07
12622 W«»i 4 - jho»**« TBOP »i:nic:c-'7_oi37
11)21 Sr*rlu>,- F tU-1 5A2}2»-2
31322 S*.:lr*t FENF-1 4A2524-I
34221 FftlTlU'lft VlTH KZK. T10X-2 T2910J0
14241 *li:.--;V]un M J1IPI7S-A
1)121 L'S Vftninv* VEU 214212)1
1)122 US Vandriva EU JI421249
JiU) CS V.rniri- V7TJ J14212S0
1)1)1 US Electrical ERHB B12I7JI
3)112 USEl«ctr«»l ERHB B12171I
351)3 US Elmrieii tP.HM OI217II
154ZI Fftirt^nWft UorM KZK. T100T-2 F-4*78?i
1612) US Vjridri»r VLi'HVCS P4177W)
14U4 US Yin-lriva WXVHYCS P4177J-I2
14133 USEl.dr Cfti EHHT» 1217(1
34134 OS Or-t.iCftl T3FTP 12TT11
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Table 4. SAMPLES FROM LIST OF ADDITIONAL
EQUIPMENT DATA
ADDITIONAL DATA rofl puk'S




















































































































(LDBJUDHAt GAT» fH ixccrazz mo*s
h» r«* .*. VOLTS i«*S PN
•42221 0.5 «•*<» 3-5? IIS.'?.'
3
6.C/3-* 1
42272 9.5 .» 3*^3 ll'.T' >>.'. /3.4
42223 0.5 m*s . 3 .'J 1 15/?:»<: 6.?/3.*
42321 0.5 »*a 3-SJ 115/.:;; 6. 5/3.*
4232* C.5 H-rt 3-5; 115/2;
•
5.:/3.*
• 42323 0.5 »"»9 3*'0 lis/-- : 6.1/1.*
43321 100 **-L'» 1770 i 3 : / - v : 225/ 1 l*.
43322 100 4*5_a '.7:0 2)"/-^; 223/11*
43*21 33 AJ^f.sPY I ''.3 2i;/-*-> 7?.7/Ji.*
3*2* 33 A3?i>»T t :o 2 - - --; 72.7/35.4
43*21 T» A3?S*>"» l=ca 2.-J/--* 7?. 7 /-;•»..* J
43*2* 33 A320*-»T 1EC3 233/*'': 72.7/li.*
43521 5 213 31 -3 233/-60 11.9/6.3
3522 S 213 3183 2j;/-t; 13.3/O.0 3
4121 0,73 5%C 1725 23?/**3 3.1/1-54
4*221 t.s J54 11*0 223/441
ixv
. 1.9/C.S5
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J oi™ M. -.-./..,->. ii
Figure 2. FoTm Ml (Reverse), Parts List
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not falling into one of these common categories, the data is entered in
the block at the botioin of the form. The reverse side of Form ill is lor
listing parts which are likely to be replaced. The basic purpose of
Form Ml is to provide an accessible file of manufacturer's data for use
in the event of a breakdown, or a proposed modification or replacement.
The data on the form is also useful for generating an equipment inven-
tory list and for planning a spare parts inventory.
The .Maintenance Procedures
Each individual Maintenance Procedure (MP) is detailed on a. numbered
Maintenance Procedure Shzet (MPS), and:
1. Defines the maintenance task in terms that allow all concerned
to know what is required, who must perform, estimate of time
xequired and how often.
2. Standardizes the procedure and sequence for doing a job in the
best known wary.
3. Expedites the accomplishment of the task by staring the tools and
materials needed and the safety precautious to be observed.
4. Provides a conciae and complete work instTuctio-n to the main-
tenance personnel in the work space. The basic objective of the
MPS is to be all inclusive. Reic-rences to other publications are
•not required since availability of outside references other than
instructions posted on or near the equipment cannot be assured.
For each equipment item in the plant, an MPS is included for each PM
Action. Since the maintenance requirements for parallel units are
identical, tha J.IPS is identified by the first four digits only and is appli-
cable to all equipment items with those first four digits.
Each MP5 has an additional two-character code. The first character
specifies the required frequency for the particular maintenance according
Xo the following list;
D - Daily Q - Quarterly
W- Weekly S- Semiannually
M-p- .Monthly A— Annually
• E. — As required
The second character is the designated number of MPs to be performed
at the specified frequency.
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32xaroples of some MPSs are included in Appendix II as Figures A—1 through
A-18. A variety of MPSs are included to show the type and extent of the
information included for different classes of equipment and maintenance
actions. Each MPS contains:
X. The number, the descriptive title and the frequency of the main-
tenance action to be performed.
2. The still level required to perform the -maintenance.
3. An average time required to perform the maintenance, not including
"make ready" and "put away" time.
4. The' complete title, identification number, nameplate data and
.location of the equipment to avoid any ambiguity over which item
of equipment is to be serviced.
5. The specific safety precautions to be observed when performing
Xhe maintenance action(s).
"6. A list of tools, parts, materials and test equipment required.
"7. The individual rtep-by-step instructions for the maintenance
action. The instructions are specific, stating which type of
.
lubricant to use, or what torque to use for tightening bolts, etc.
The fiTSt instruction is always a_repetition cf the safety precautions.
A concise summary list of Maintenance Procedure"- (MPs) was generated
to enable the Maintenance Engineer to rapidly identify the P2>i actions for
•each trait in the plant. Table 5 is a sample page ci the summary list of
Maintenance Procedures for the Lower Potomac Plant. This summary
lists the operating unit, the description of the work to be performed lor
•each Jblahrtenance Procedure, the frequency of each PM task, the man-
power requirement by skill and time in minutes for each PM task, and
a key which initiates the schedule for performing each PM task. This
Vey is simply the first scheduled week number, not necessarily January 1,
but the .week selected for PMMS start up, from which all other scheduled
wteic numbers automatically follow.
1. "Daily and weekly MPs are, of coarse, scheduled for every week
. from one to fifty-two.
2. For monthly MPs, add to the key number: 0, 4, 8. 13. 17, 21,
26, 30, 34, 39, 43. 47.

-Table 5. SAMPLE FROM .LIST OF
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES
(keyed to Maintenance Procedure Sheets [MPSsJ)
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2 D-ar Screen Mechanical Clcaocor
lulmc^:c bar acrrn
Inspect r-ke assembly ir.t chajn
Inspect coutitir* eight* shock iCtorirri
2 Victor. rVar Sc reen Cleaner
Cicin rr.ctor and perform clec. lupctUoa
Lubricc'e motor
2 Drive. Sir Screeo Cleiair
Cheer, o.l level
Change l_1
2 Conrxxl. Bar Se-re-em Cleaoex
Clean ari inspect cotrtro'.le r
Clcao aai inspect remota control awttcb
3 Coavc>or, Bar Screen Cleanings
Inspect ard lubricate conveyor
3 Ui'or. Conve7<rr. Ear irrn O«ao-nf •
lr.spi-ct inf« belt's) tension
Clean rrc'.or aod perform elec. Inspecrloa)
Uijnutf motor
3 Drive. Conveyor. Bar ScTee-o Oesniesrs
Check oil level
Chang* oil
1 Contrc!. Conveyor. Bar Screes Gleacjnga
Clean an-; m«r«e-ct controller
Clean in; inspect remote control stvitca.
2 Crircer. 3-r Screen Cleanings
LcbricAti g-nider
Inspect <:ri*e belt's) tension
Inspect gnncler
2 Motor a-*d Drive. Grimier. Ba-r Scr-e*ni CUa— *»gl
Cleao enctsr and prrltrm ciec aAap^ctaoa
Labrirate motor
2 Control. Cnncir, 2-*lt 5cmu C:tuua|i
Clean Id inspect casslstiilrT
Clean ar.d inspect remote c l ''J-io I swnxck
3 Raw Wastewater Pump A





















3. For quarterly MPs, add to the key number: 0. 13, 26, 39.
4. For semiannual MPs, add to th.j key number:. 0, 26.
5. For annual MPs, the key number is the scheduled week number.
The Preventive Maintenance fPM) Cyde Schedule
The PM actions are scheduled for each of the 52 weeks of the year.
Table 6 is a sample listing of the Maintenance Procedures (MPs) scheduled
for a particular week at the Lower Potomac Plant. The list is generally
organized so that all MPs for a single unit in the plant are listed together
for the purpose of assigning them to a single team at a time. Hence, the
unit need be removed from service only once. Furthermore, the schedule
was generated to group MPSs on the same unit, although of differing
frequencies, during the same weeks.
The actual work assignment on a daily basis is left to the discretion of
the foreman and plant management, since operational constraints,
corrective maintenance work loads and employee absenteeism cannot be
fully anticipated.
During one week in each quarter of the year, only daily and weekly PM
is scheduled. The remaining time may be vised by the plant to catch up
on delayed preventive and corrective maintenance, and may also be used
to allov/ for periods of high absenteeism (vacations, .Easter week,
Christmas week, etc.).
In addition to a list of MPs for each week of the year, the schedule lists
the daily a-nd weekly tasks separately. To augment the lists for each of
the weeks, a master schedule displays the individualPM tasks for each
operating unit in th" plant iox the entire year. Tins master schedule is
part of the summary of Maintenance Procedures described previously
{Table 5). An optional display in the form of a wall chart would enable
the Maintenance Engineer to see at a glance what the PM work load will
be, or alternately, to see when PM is to be performed on any particular
unit.
The Recordkeeping Svstem
The recordkeeping system of the PMMS consists cf six forms. Forms
Ml and M2 are permanent records for each item of equipment, containing
reference data and cumulative maintenance data. Form M3 is a temporary
record of preventive maintenance actions, and Forms M4, M5 and M6
are temporary records of corrective maintenance actions.

1>3
Table 6. EXAMPJLE OF WEEKLY JP1S SCIIELDUJ-E
Week J
Jill Ml 2133 Ml 5222 Ql
1112 Ql 2133 Ql 5224 Ql
1112 Al 2242 Ml 5225 Ql
1113 Ql 2332 Ml 5312 Ml
J114A1 - 2332 M2 5564 Ml
1114 A2 2332 M3 5571 Ml
1334 Ml 2332 Ql 5573 Ml
-2112 Ml 2332 51 55S1 Ml
.2131 111 2332 52 5583 Ml
2132 Ql 5221 Ml 5711 Ql
2132 Q2 5221 M2 5712 or
Perform these pi as all Daily and "Ceekly
Maintenance Procedures (MPs), keyed to
Maintenance Procedure Sheets (MPSs).
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Form Ml. "Equipmrnr Reference Data," was described previously and
is showr; in Figures 1 and 2.
Form M2. the "Equipment Maintenance Record," provides an historical
file of all PM and CM performed on a particular item of equipment. This
6-1/2 x 11-inch permanent record, shown in Figure 3. will be useful in
the event of a breakdown or an impending breakdown, and for an examina-
tion of trends and of any indications of equipment deterioration with time.
Each time a maintenance action is performed an entry is made on Form M2.
The MPS number ot the job number specifics, respectively, whether the
action is PM or CM. The "Labor" entry is for recording the skill level,
the initials of the mechanic and the actual manhours expended. The
"Observations" entry is coded according to the list of Indicators and
Modifiers, which is included as Table A-2. In addition to this coded
entry, a descriptive statement can be made, when necessary, in the
".Remarla and Data" column. The "Volts," "Amps" and "Megohms"
entries 2tc reserved for maintenance on electric motors.
Forms M3, M4 and M5 are temporary 5 x 8-inch records. Form M3,
Figures 4 and 5. is a "Preventive Maintenance Work Record, " which
"the mechanic uses while on the job to document that the PM work has
been done and to record the labor expended and the measurements made.
The checklist on Form M3 is used by the mechanic to indicate whether
there was any indication of trouble during the routine PM and inspection.
If any of the "Trouble" boxes are checked, the reverse side of Form M3,
"Report cf Txo.ah.Ie, " is used by the mechanic to provide a detailed
explanation.
"Form M3X, a variation of Form M3, is shown in Figure 6. This format
is used for dailj and weekly actions, and conserves the amount of paper
handled by having muitiple entries on one form. In practice, tb'>* farm
is printed on the back of the 8-1/2 x 11-inch Maintenance Procedure
Sheet, on heavy card slock, which is used repetitively until the available
spaces are filled or until the card is mutilated. At that point, a replace-
ment is made.
"Whichever of the two Form M3 formats is used, and whether or not any
of the "Trouble" boxes are checked, the data from Form M3 is transcribed
onto the permanent Form M2. If there is no "Trouble, *« Form M3 cau be
discarded once the PM data have been recorded. If trouble has been
spotted. Form M5 must be filled out to initiate CM action.
Form M4, the "Equipment Malfunction Report," shown in Figure 7, serves
a similar purpose as the "Report of Trouble" side of M3, except that M4
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Figure 5. Form M3 (Reverse), Report of Trouble
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Figure 7. Joua M4, Equipment Malfunction Report
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is intended for use by plant operators or anyone else noticing a malfunc-
tion (M3 is intended for use by maintenance mo<-hanic9 while performing
PM). Completed forms ?vi4 should, of course, be promptly deiiveTed to
the Maintenance Department. Pads of blank M4 Forma should be in con-
venient locations throughout the plant.
fornn M5 and M6, .shown in .Figures 8 and 9, are for initiating CM
whenever the "Trouble" side of Form M3 or Form M4 has been received
by the Maintenance .Department. Form M5, a 5 x 8—inch "Corrective
Maintenance "Work Order, " is j>zcrp3jrcd with cost and downtime estimates
mrbva analysis indicates that corrective action is required. This infor-
mation is automatically reproduced, by the use cf carbon or NCR-type
paper, onto the top cf Form M6. The combined forms then are signed,
and a job number is issued, allowing the CM work to be initiated. At this
point, the forms are separated; Form M5 is retained as an open work
order, while Form M6 is U3ed by the field maintenance personnel.
The lower half of M6, which is an 8-1/2 x 11-inch form, is nsed to record
the labor, parts and materials used, descriptions and recommendations,
equipment status and spare parts availability, and actual corrective
maintenance costs and downtime. The maintenance -foreman and the
xequestor sign off on the completed wotL At this time. Form M5 may
fce discarded. An appropriate entry is made on-Form M2, and Form M6
is kept in the permanent equipment file with the Ml and M2 iorxns.
The Recordkeeping System has been constructed to segregate the coding
and the paperwork from the mechanics. The mechanics are given appro-
priate MPSs which explicitly identify both the equipment and- procedure
in common language. The mechanics fill out Forms M3 (or M4) *n^ Mo,
which are designed as simple checklists. No other paperwork burden
is placed upon the mechanics.
The Maintenance Data Feedback Svstem
ronnl.17, shown as Fignres 10 and 11, is a weekly maintenance summary
report which is prepared by the Maintenance Technician for plant
management. There are three parts to Form M7: a Work Load 5unmary
*nd a "Work Accomplished Summary on the front of the form, and a Correc-
tive Maintenance Summary on the back.
The "Work Load 5urrrmary corresptsnds to the balance sheet in a financial
Teport. The new work load for the week is added to the old backlog for
the total outstanding work; from this total is subtracted the work accomp-
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Fairfax C«unif Lo—»r PoIonvK Pollution Control Plant
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A separate balance sheet is included for PM and for CM, and the new total
backlog is shown. For the Work .Load Summary, all xnanhours axe expressed
as "estimated" manhours.
The Work Accomplished Summary corresponds to the income statement
in a financial report. The objective is to show the actual labor and the
actual costs incurred during the week.
"The Corrective Maintenance Summary lists all CM work orders (Form M3)
that "were outstanding at the beginning cf the week and those that were
initiated during the week. Those items that were completed during the
week are noted by an er.try in the "Completion Date" column. For plant
management to decide which jobs to attack first, this Summary lists an
Equipment Status Code and a Priority Code for each job. The "Remarks"
column should be used for comments such as "awaiting spare parts. "
The weekly maintenance su .iuiiary report is prepared for plant management
by the Maintenance Technician. The report is generated directly from the
data in the Recordkeeping System. Aside from providing management with
timely important data, the Feedback System is designed to relieve manage—
.ment of any paperwork burden.
.SP.ECTAT, COXSTDSRATIOIo IN THS PMMS
The Maintenance Technician
The permanent records, the Indicators and Modifiers Code,- the PM Cycle
Schedule, and the Equipment Configuration numbering system do not con-
cern the mechanics in the performance of their work. All of the scheduling
and monitoring for the PM-LiS is performed by a Maintenance Technician.
His efforts may be strictly manual in smaller plants, or he may use
rompnlers or other data processing de-vices in medinm-to -large plants.
The Technician position is essential to the successful implementation of
the PMMS. It is the intention of the PMMS to remove the paperwork burden
-from the mechanics and from plant management, and to concentrate the
paperwork and coordination of details upon the Technician.
The duties of the Maintenance Technician are;
1. To maintain and update a file for each item of equipment in the
plant. The Technician records, on a continual basis, each pre-
ventive maintenance action taken. The data recorded includes
the date, a code describing what was done, the initials and labor
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category of the mechanic(s), the labor hours ror.sumed, readings
or measurements taken, and a coded entry of observations the
mechanic will make regarding equipment condition. The Teclrrdcian
relieves the mechanics of any formal record-taking by transcribing
his freestyle comments onto a permanent record. The Technician
ghotild therefore be Xamiliar with equipment and with maintenance
procedures to effectively communicate with the mechanics, and
should be capable of using codes for recording and retrieval
purposes.
2. To record corrective maintenance actions and equipment modifi-
cations in the equipment file. For corrective maintenance actions,
the record will include labor hours, spare parts and purchased
services, a cost for each item and for the total, the reasons for
the breakdown, and suggestions for preventing similar breakdowns.
The Technician is expected to understand and summarize the inputs
from engineers and mechanics.
3. To maintain and update a file on equipment data, which will include
type, model number, serial number, .size, capacity, spare parts
mil i ihm, etc.
4. To prepare, on a weekly basis, the working copies of the MPSs
(for planned PM actions) fron a schedule and from a master file
of sheets.
3. Jo retrieve and summarize data on equipment history, equipment
condition, maintenance history, maintenance costs, and manpower
requirements for the use of plant management. The Technician
should be capable of providing meaningful summaries to relieve
management of the burden of exami ning large quantities of data
items.
6. To identify and implement improvements to the maintraTmce system.
Skills of Field Personnel




Appendix I contains detailed job descriptions for these three labor categories.
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In very small plants, a single individual generally performs all main-
tenance (possibly in addition to plant operations), so that this individual
should have overall capability. Conversely, there is some trend today
even in large plants to train maintenance personnel to perform both elec-
trical and mechanical tasks, so that when a unit is taken out of service
it may be completely attended to by a single man. This philosophy also
aids in diagnosing malfunctions, where the precise cause of trouble is
not -readily apparent. This PMMS was developed to differentiate between
skills; however, it is useful whether or not a wastewater treatment
plant differentiates between skills.
Tor some plants, a sepa rate instrumentation mechanic may be on the staff.
To be most widely useful, this model PMMS did not assume that a separate
skill existed for maintaining measurement devices and meters and recorders,
but assigned these tasks as appropriate to either Skill 1 or Skill 2. In actual
practice at the Lower Potomac Plant of Fairfax County, an Instrumentation
Technician was added to the staff midway through the demonstration phase
of the program. The PMMS was readily adaptable to this change without
.formally changing the PMMS paperwork. When the week's PM tasks were
given to the maintenance foreman, he easily identified those appropriate
to the Instrumentation Technician.
"The Skill 3 category is labeled "Utility Man," and it indicates a lower
level of experience than either Skill 1 or Skill 2. This distinction ia
«xtxemely important in conserving the skilled manpower available for
'those tasks repairing the higher experience. Tabic A-3, the PM man-
power requirement for the Lower Potomac Plant, shows that well over
50 peicenl cd the total PM maakours is in the Skill 3 category, the cate-
gory where personnel should be more available and of lower cost.
Consistent with the philosophy of this program to make the model PMMS
most useful on a nationwide basis, no attempt was made to farther brea_k
down Skill 3 into sub-skills pexcuiiar to any plant or organization.
Jn actual practice at the Lower Potomac Plant, the bulk of the Skill 3
work has been accomplished by mechanics' helpers within the Maintenance
Department. Several exceptions were made, with Operations personnel
performing time-consuming tasks such as cleaning the sludge belt con-
veyors (prior to Skill 2 inspection and lubrication) and draining and cleaning
primary settling tanks, secondary aeration tanks and chloriuation contact
chambers (prior to Skill .2 inspection).
Ittany of the Skill 3 tasks consist of routine repetitive PM actions requiring
a minimum of judgement or special skills. At the option of the plant
utilizing the PMMS, much of the Skill - 3 workload may be accomplished
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by plant operators, rather than hy assigned personnel from the Maintenance
Department. There arc two sides to this question. In f.">vor ol such a
division Ls the potentially significant cost and manpower savings, since
fjjmi 3 tasks comprise well over 50 percent of the overall work load.
Against such a division axe:
X. A division is made in pride and responsibility; i.e., in the sense
d "ownership" of equipment by regular maintenance mechanics
winch was evident at Lower Potoruac.
.2. An important feature of the Toutinc repetitive ?M actions is that
maintenance personnel got arour.d the plant on a regular daily basis
and are therefore quick to spot any signs of impending trouble.
Conversely, a shift operator may not be trained well enough to
either notice the abnormality or to assign proper significance
to it.
Judging by the tangible positive results at the Lower Potomac Plant, rt is
recommended that the Maintenance Department perform as much of the
PMMS as is feasible within the very real constraints of the personnel
available and the budget.
"Cross Reference V/ith Design Engineer's Code
When an existing, operating plant such as the Lower Potomac Plant installs
a PMMS, the PMMS must take into account that the decign engineer's
equipment names and codes have become commonly used means for iden-
tifying equipment. The introduction of a new nomenclature yia the PMMS
does not change the commonly used nomenclature overnight. Hence, the
PMMS must be structured so that the common names. of equipment are
-retained in the lists, procedures, schedules, etc.
To correlate this dual nomenclature, a concise cross-reference list vras
prepared. Table A-4, for the Lower Potomac Plant, includes the design
engineer's code for pumps, measurement transmitters and measurement
receivers. Additional pumps in Area K are also included in Table A-4
for completeness.
Cross References for Remote Electrical Controls and
Remote Alarm indicators
In addition to measurement receivers (meters and recorders), -which
were covered in the previous section, there are two other instances where
an equipment item may be quite remote from its functionally operating
Unit. One instance is the remote electrical controls. Table A-5 lists
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the MPS numbers corresponding to the operating functional unit ID number,
cross referenced to oc-j or niore remote cent : oilers. Table A-6 cross
xefexencea alarm operating functional numbers to one or more remote
alarm indicators.
"These cross-reference lists are to be used, of course, with the basic
_£e,uipmcn£ Configuration list, which pxovides data and location for each
equipment item.
"These cross references have been incorporated into the appropriate
Maintenance Procedure Sheets. The remote electrical controllers are
scheduled to be serviced at the same time as the PM on the process unit,
while it is out of service. Observers are stationed at alarm indicators
while malfunctions or abnormal conditions arc simulated at the operating
locations.
Insulation Resistance of Electric Motors
Since the insulation resistance of electric motors is very highly tempera-
ture dependent, a means for standardizing measured values is needed.
There axe two reasons why these insulation resistance measurements
Suut b-e made when the motor is at ambient temperature: .first, to avoid
any appreciable temperature gradients, either spatial or temporal; and
• econd, there is generally only the capability of measuring a constant
ambient temperature. Once the insulation resistance at a measured
ambient temperature is known, I*igure_12 may be used to correct this
alne to a standard 70 deg x value
Hepainting of Plant Equipment
The PMV.S includes a detailed MPS for repainting plant equipment and
piping. No formal schedule or m.~.-houx estimate is associated with this
.MPS since requirements depend largely upon location, service, climate,
etc. ; and since the need fox repainting is readily apparent.
"Preventive Maintenance for Incineration
The sludge incineration and auxiliary process equipment require special
attention in scheduling and performing preventive and corrective
maintenance. The plant design provided redundant incinerator systems.
Tiarh xncineratoT system ami its related equipment must be operated as
a unit except for the induced draft fans which can be temporarily bypassed.
Table A-7 is a list of the sensitive equipment requiring special attention
in the maintenance management system. Two categories of special pre-
trentive'maintenance have been identified:
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INSm-ATlO?! 'RESISTANCE CORRZL'i iUN—multiply measured
resistance correction factor
Sliaimum corrected resistance:
Class A insulation, 40 megohms
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1. Category A—The MP is to be performed without shutting down
the equipment.
2. Category 15—The MP is to be performed with the equipment taken
out of service, but it must be scheduled to coincide with a shut-
down of the entire incinerator by coordination between Maintenance
and Operations.
Corrective maintenance may or may not require complete shut down of
"the affected incinerator and the auxiliary equipment. A judgement must
be made by the Maintenance Department and coordinated with Operations.
In addition, should one unit not be in service for an extended period, the
unit and its auxiliary equipment should be exercised under full Maintenance/
Operations coordination,
Table A-8 is a list of the MPSs in Category A, and Table A-9 is a list of
the MPSs in Category B. Table A-9 should be used as a checklist to ensure
that all scheduled MPSs are accomplished when the incinerator is shut
down.
On eacb of the MPSs corresponding to Table A-S. there is a notation that.
Thia procedure is to be performed v/ithotrt shuttir.; down the equipment. •*
On the MPSs corresponding to Table A-9, the notation reads, "This









A. Seawater Conors len
The Contained Seawater Conversion and Power Plant (Desalina-
tion Plant) Is comprised of a steam and condensate system, a power genera-
ting system and a seawater.. ccnversion system. The steam and condensate
system includes three Erie City 120,000 pounds per hour high pressure
steam boilers, the plant energy ccnversion source, and all interconnecting
condensers, pumps, distribution lines, and condensate surge tanks that
combine the three plan' systems. Ihe power generation system includes
two Westinghcuse 7»5Q0XW turbine generators with low pressure process
steam extraction supplying the evaporators' energy source. Ihe seawater
conversion system includes three Westinghouse 750,000 gallons per day
Enltistage flash evaporators with brine recycle reheat and phosphate/
acid" scale control. Figure 5 provides a rudimentary schenatic of the
contained plant depicting major plant components.











SEAWATER CONVERSION a POWER
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It 13 appropriate new to analyze the seawater conversion system.
The seawater conversion system serves four basic functions: (1) water
production to neet Ease consumption , (2) water quality control to ensure
water suitable for demestic and industrial consumption, v. 3 J efficiency/
control to provide maxL-eum production with nlnLnisn consumption of energy
and supplies, and (A) corrosion cent re
1
to protect the government 's
investment in the plane. We snail discuss now hew the seawater conver-
sion system performs the four functions.
- production -
In discussing the water production function, it is helpful first to
have a clear understanding of the heat and pressure relationship between
liquids and gases as transformaticn from liquld-to-gas or gas-to—liquid
takes place. The transformation is alwavs accompanied by a transfer of
heat called the LAITC.T HEAT C? VAPCRJZATICIJ. The magnitude of the heat
Of vaporieation varies in direct proportion to the pressure of the liquid,
I.e., the lower the pressure, the less heat required for vaporieation.
At a specified energy content, a pure liquid can exist in equilibrium
with its vapor at but one pressure, its vapor pressure. This condition
Is reached naturally in the ear-en' s water cycle as the sun adds heat to
seawater through radiation until the latent heat of vapcrizaelcn corre-
sponding to atmospheric pressure is reached and water molecules escare
from the sea as vapor. The limit is also reached through a sudden drop
In pressure above the liquid. As the pressure drops, the liquid will
transfer its heat corresponding to the equilibrium limit for the former pres-
sure until it contains only enough internal energy to exist in equilibrium
with the gas at the new lower pressure. The excess heat transferred
become the LATZT.T rZ.-T" C? VAPORIZATION for surrounding water molecules
giving them the energy required eo escaoe from the surface of the water
and become a vapor. It can be seen, then, thae through manipulating the
energy content and pressure of a liquid, one can generate artificially
the conditions required to transform a liquid to a gas and then back to
a liquid again.
Ihe Guantanamo Seawater Conversion System utilizes the principles
stated in converting raw seawater into high quality potable water. In
analyzing the rroduction aspect of the seawater conversion system, it
Is evident fro.- the preceding paragraph that three facilities are re-
quired: (1) the facility for manipulating the energy content of the fluid,
(2) The facility for manipulating the pressure of the fluid, and (3) the
vessel or chamber containing the process.
The GUantanamo Seawater Conversion units consist of trt-o 15-stage and
die 23-stage Milt1-Stage Flash (.'•£?) evaporators. A general diagram of


























Figure o. Seawater Conversion System
The evaporators receive raw seawater from Gua.Tta.tano Bay and the
energy content of the cool seawater or brine is boosted through the
Brine Reheating Systsn. the pressure of the heated brine is reduced
through the £'.^::n:3r Air Ejector System , and the process is contained
by the Evaporator Vessel, uez us go first, to the evaporator vessel.
Figure 7 provides a graphic view of the cross-section of a typical















Evaporator Stags Crcs3 Section
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The vessel illustrated In Figure 7 has four basic components: (1)
the vessel shell, (2) the demlster screen, (3) the heat recovery tube
bundle, and (*0 the product trough. Tne vessel contains and aids the
process whereby brlr.e travels from stage to stage at Incrementally
decreasing pressures and releases its energy to achieve equilibrium at
the new pressure. The excess energy becomes the heat of vaporization for
surrounding water molecules which in turn "flash" into vapor thus the
name "flash evaporator". The warm vapor travels to the upper section .
through the demlster screen which removes mist. The vapor then encounters
the cool heat recovery tuces, transfers its latent heat of vaporization
to the tubes, and condenses. The condensate of distillate then drips down
Into the product water trough and is eventually pumped into the base
>ater system for consumption.
The Brine Reheating System consists of a shell and tube heat ex-
changer which accepts "spent" steam extracted from the plant turbines
(see Figure 5) and, using this as the energy scarce, transfers heat to
the brine entering from the heat recovery tube bundle of Stage No. 1.
The heated brine is then discharged into the lower section of the first
and hottest stage, at a pressure lower than its equilibrium pressure,
and the flashing process begins.
The Evaporator Air Ejector System (see Figure 6) consists of a
high pressure steam nozzle assembly that takes suction "of the 15th
evaporator stage (the final and coolest stage) and vents to an inter- and
after-condenser. The ejectors maintain 29 in. Kg vacuum in the 15th stage
and preceding stages are maintained, at incrementally higher pressures
through the partial pressure of vapor flashing at the incrementally
higher brine energy levels.
We can visualize now cool seavater entering the evaporator heat
recovery tube bundles and proceeding through the evaporator continuous-ly
picking vd the heat of vaporization of the condensing product. A final
boost of heat to the brine is received in the "brine heater". Then we
see the hot brine begin its odyssey frcn the 1st stage to the 15th
stage at incrementally decreasing pressures, continually attempting to
achieve equilibrium in each stage through the transfer of heat and
Hashing into vapor. We then see the vapor giving up its heat of vapori-
zation to the heat recovery tubes and condensing to form the required
product.
- QUALITY OCNTRCL -
Through the facilities discussed, the Guantanamo Seawater Con-
version System fulfills the function of water production. Second only
to production is the function of product water "quality control".
The physical facility for providing product quality control in the
evaporators is the demister screens as was shown in Figure 7- The
screens physically separate the condensing product water from the flashing
brine and stop the t:-'v--fer of any brine droplets carried with the water
vapor. Chemical treatment of the makeup water entering the evaporator with
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an anti-foaming agent further enhances quality control. The anti-
foaming as211--* as ^t3 nane irolies, deters foaming In the hot brine and
reduces the liquid carryover to the demister screen. The result of these
quality control reasures is the production of distillate free of the
chlorides of calcium, magr.esiun, and sodium which are so prevalent in
seawater. Keedless to say, the early indication of problems developing
In the evaporator is an increase in chlorides in the product water.
- EFFICIENCY -
When production and quality control are ensured, one naturally
concerns himself with the efficiency of the system. In its simplest terns
the efficiency of the evaporator becomes the effectiveness of heat
transfer to the brine and the ability to recycle waste heat. The
Cuantanamo systems recycle waste heat through the "brine recycle system" and
naintain heat transfer effectiveness througn the "acid feed and Hagevap
systems".
Figure 6 shews raw seawater frcn GT7D Bay entering the 15th stage
tube bundle and proceeding through stares 14 and 13 consecutively while
"reclaiming" the latent heat of vaporization fron the flashing brine.
At the discharge of stage 13 sore of the seawater is channeled into the
Eake'up line (to be used to "make-up" for the brine evaporated Into
product water and brine discharged to reduce salinity concentrations
(blowdown)) and the rest is rejected to waste. Because most of the water
is rejected to waste, the 13th, lnth and 15th stages are termed "heat
reject stages".
The makeup water then proceeds through the makeup line back to the
lower section of stage 15 where it is mixed with the returning highly
saline brine for dilution. Ihe mixture is then pumped cut of stage 15
into the heat recovery bundle of stage 12 to continue its odyssey through
the evaporator. Thus the waste energy contained in the brine in the 15th
stage is recycled.
The rethod through which waste energy is recycled and the effect of
recycle on water chemistry and energy/chemical consumption is of interest
in that it is considered a prime source of possible increases in evaoorator
efficiency and consequent reduction in water production costs. In this
respect, blowdcwn has a major effect on evaporator efficiency. As the
water vapor evaporates frcn the heated brine leaving behind mineral
residue the total solids and chloride content of the recycling brine in-
creases proportionally. Continuous blowdovn is required to discharge con-
centrated brine and replace it with fresh makeup water thus maintaining the
recycle chloride concentration at an acceptable level. Experimental analysis
has proven that the optimum- chloride level for recycle at which the evapor-
ator will operate most effectively is approximately 30, COO parts per million
(PPM). Referring back to F±~^re 3 it is seen that Cuantanamo seawater
ha3 21,300 PPM chlorides. The ratio of recycle chlorides to Cuantanamo
seawater chlorides, then, is 1.5 to 1. This ratio?, which is known as the
Concentration Factor (CF)
,
provides an indicator of salinity buildup in
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the evaporators and guides the blcvdcwn requirerasnt. Based en exper-
imental data blowdo,n Is plotted against ccr.cent ration factor In Figure
8.
FIGURE .8. BLOWDOWN VS. CONCENTRATION FACTOR.
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It i3 seen fron Fig-ore 8 that blcwdcwn decreases exponentially
as C? Increases. Using the 30,000 PPM upper limit on our chloride
level in recycle brine the C? can be Increased above the 1.5 level
only by diluting the 21,030 PPM chloride seawater makeup. Cbvlously,
by decreasing the makeup, chlorides, the C? can be increased to a
theoretical limit of infiiiity (blowdovm 0) with a makeup chloride
level of zero (pure H20).
The dilution of evaporator seawater makeup with a low chloride
water resource is an excellent application for wastewater reclamation.
low chloride treated wastewater can be injected into the evaporator
rakeup line to allow a significant increase In the concentration factor
and resultant reduction in blowdown without increasing the 30,000 PPM
recycle salinity concentration. The reduced blowdown will result in
substantial energy and chemical savings for the evaporators.
Let us new lock at the methods of maintaining heat transfer
effectiveness in the Gua.ntana.Ti3 evaporators. As is seen in Figure 3,
seawater contains copious a-xrur.ts of hardness in the form of soluble
calcium and magnesium chlorides, carbonates, and sulfates. At high
teirperatures, these soluble salts will tend to bake onto evaporator heat
trans ferrsurfaces and fom a hard scale. The hard scale, in turn, re-
duces the heat transfer coefficient of the heat transfer surfaces and
consequently reduces the efficiency and capacity of the "evaporator. The
problem becores one of detering the formation of scale in the evaporators.
It has been standard practice fcr decades in the steam power in-
dustry to treat boiler feedwater with rhosphates to fight hard scale. .
The phosphate will react with the soluble calcium or magnesium salt and
fom a harries s insoluble sludge easily removable fran the system. 3y
taking this principle one step further and adapting it to seawater, the
Guantanamo seawater irakeup is treated with a phespnate compound krivAan as
HACEVAP. Figure 6 shows the Kagevap feed system feeding the makeup line
to the 15th stare where the calcium and raxr.esium salts are at their
greatest concentrations. Subsequently, the treated brine proceeds to the
12th stage heat recovery tube bundle to begin its journey to the 1st stage
and brine heater at ever increasing temperatures but with the phosphate .
protection against hard scale.
To enhance the phosphate treatment an additional chemical must be
added to carry away the insoluble sludge. The sludge formed by the
phosphate treatment tends to collect an the heat transfer surfaces and
reduce efficiency and capacity in the evaporators after about a week of
operation. To remove the adhering sludge the "evaporator acid feed
system" Is activated to Inject sulphuric acid into the evaporator makeup.
The acid feed system is s imply an acid storage tank with a small pump
and discharge line connected to- the seawater makeup line shown in Figure
6.
Through the use of the brine recycle system waste heat and chemicals
are recovered and through the >x->e of the Hagevap and acid feed systems
heat transfer effectiveness is maintained. The problem of lagging evap-




Let us turn now to the system function that presents the desalination
Industry with the most problems and, when Ineffective, adversely affects
production, quality control, and efficiency of the evaporator: Corrosion
control.
Corrosion tray be defined as ". . .the destruction or deterioration of
metal by direct cherlcal or electrochemical reaction with its environment''.
We knew that certain metals naturally resist corrosion such as gold, silver,
or copper; therefore, the corrosion control function becomes one of select-
ing the retals for evaporator construction that will least tend to corrode,
aid to provide a system that will deter the real's direct reaction with its
environment. Heedless to say, the corrosion resistant retals listed would
make evaporator construction using these retals too expensive for practical
use. We are faced, then, with the preble.Tt of constr-icting cur evaporator
with the inexpensive alleys of iron and providing facilities for catering
the electrochemical reaction of iron with seawater.
The element Iron when placed In contact with water tends to go into the
solution in the form of electrically charged iron ions, but, since the
solution nrjst re.nain electrically neutral, these positive ions can enter
the solution only if an equivalent n-rxer of positive ions of sere other
element are scme.now displaced. Ihus , when iron is placed in water the
element irnediately plated cut is KYDKKEM which gathers on the iron surface
as a thin invisible fila. This is the typical "primary reaction of corrosion"
eia cay oe expressed as follows
:
Fe 2H+ -^ y re4* + 2H
rfetal Ions Ion Atoms
The activity of this primary reaction will always be directly proportional
to the hydrogen ion activity in the water. . .tne greater the hydrogen icn
activity in the water, the mere ions there are to plate out and the rxre Iron
that goes into solution. Kycbrgen icn activity is normally measured in terns
of pH factor. A high pH factor indicates a low hydrogen icn activity and
vice versa. Thus, to reduce the hydrogen ion activity in water and deter the
prirBry reaction of corrosion, one must increase the pH factor.
After the primary reaction, corrosion proceeds with the destruction of
the hydrogen flit. This happens in two ways: (1) In basic water (pH above
7), the hydrogen combines with oxygen present in solution to form water, or
(2) In acidic wa'xr (pH oelcw 7) it escapes as bubbles of hydrogen gas. This
brings us to the "secondary reaction of corrosion" which may be expressed as
follows:






Shese permit the primary reaction to proceed with the acomlation In the
solution of Fe+++ which Is oxidised and precipitated as rust a3 follows:
2Jfe'
H+ + V2 - 2 + K20 * 2Fe
+++
+ 2GH~
Insoluble ferric hydroxide (rust)
The secondary reaction rray be deterred by simply removing the dissolved
oxygen frcn the v:ater and denying the plated hydrogen atoms transportation
back into solution.
From the preceding analysis it is seen that the corrosion control
function beccres cr.e of maintaining a hifji Fll factor ana/cr removing dis-
solved oxygen frcn the water. Guantanamo seawater has a pH factor of
7-6 which is a basic pH and reasonably high. The addition of caustic
chemicals such as sodium hydroxide to raise the pH factor of the seawater
would interfere, with the acid treatrent previously discussed; therefore,
caustic feed is net used in Guantanamo to deter corrosion.
CAjt corrosion control function is one of deterring the secondary corro-
sion reaction through the removal of dissolved oxygen frcn the makeup water.
The oxygen is removed through a "vacuum degassifier" which heats the makeup
water with steam and exposes it to vacuum conditions while cascading it
through '"scrubbing" trays. The degassifler utilizes the principles of
"Henry's law" and "Dalton's Law" which imply that the solubility of a gas
In a solution Is directly proportional to its pressure and Inversely pro-
portional to its temperature. The gases removed in the degassifier are
vented to the evaporator's 15th stage and subsecuently removed by the air
ejector. Refer to Figure 6 and note that the degassifier is located in the
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